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MONOPOLIST, ARISTOCRAT, OR 
ENTREPRENEUR?: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE OF 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PARTNERSHIPS IN  
THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, GERMANY,  
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AFTER THE 
DISINTEGRATION OF ANDERSEN LEGAL 
MARY C. DALY* 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
A. Introduction 
For approximately the past four years, a debate has raged in the United 
States1 over whether and to what extent a lawyer should be permitted to 
participate with a nonlawyer in a multidisciplinary partnership (MDP).2 
 * James H. Quinn Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; J.D., 1972, Fordham 
University School of Law; LL.M., 1978, New York University School of Law. Professor Daly is the 
Director of the Law School’s Graduate Program and Co-Director of its Louis Stein Center for Law and 
Ethics. The themes explored in this Article are drawn in part from Mark S. Osiel, Lawyers as 
Monopolists, Aristocrats, and Entrepreneurs, 103 HARV. L. REV. 2009 (1990). Readers who are not 
familiar with this thoughtful work are urged to read it. The Article does not employ the terms 
“monopolist,” “aristocrat,” and “entrepreneur” in precisely the same way as Professor Osiel’s, 
however. 
 1. The debate began to take shape in 1997 when a Presidential Global Showcase at the ABA 
Annual Meeting in San Francisco highlighted multidisciplinary partnerships (MDPs). The ABA 
Journal published a cover story on MDPs in February 1998. See John Gibeaut, Squeeze Play: As 
Accountants Edge into the Legal Market, Lawyers May Find Themselves Not Only Blindsided by the 
Assault But Also Limited by Professional Rules, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 42. In that same month, the 
ABA established a Working Group on Accountants and the Legal Profession. The ABA Center on 
Professional Responsibility made the Working Group’s subject matter the focus of its plenary session 
at the 24th National Conference on Professional Responsibility in May 1998.  
 In the summer of 1998 the debate entered the public arena when the Paris Bar Association 
mounted an aggressive campaign to bring MDPs to the organized bar’s attention. Cynthia Cotts, 
Parisians: Accountants Are Coming, NAT’L L.J, June 22, 1998, at A6 (quoting one bar official as 
warning “[T]he U.S. bar had better hurry up and develop a regulatory system to monitor accounting 
firms—or else the Big [Five] w[ill] swallow up the market for legal services in the United States, as 
they are doing abroad.”); Melody Petersen, Paris Lawyers Are Seeking Barricades Against the Big 6: 
Accounting Giants Get Legal Work Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1998, at D2. See Program Summary, 
Multidisciplinary Legal Practice: Opportunities and Challenges for the Future (June 8, 1998) (on file 
with the author) (summarizing a program sponsored by the Ordre des Avocate à la Cour de Paris and 
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York).  
 2. “MDP” can also stand for multidisciplinary practice. The difference between the two is 
subtle, but important. “Multidisciplinary practice” refers to “the activities of a professional services 
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The recent criminal conviction of Arthur Andersen L.L.P. (Andersen), its 
ensuing collapse, and a rash of high profile accounting scandals have 
stoked the flames of the debate even higher. 
The debate’s history begins in 1998 when the President of the 
American Bar Association (ABA) appointed the Commission on 
Multidisciplinary Practice (Commission or ABA Commission).3 The 
intensity of the debate reached a feverish pitch in 1999 and again in 2000 
when the Commission proposed significant changes to the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct that would have permitted lawyers and nonlawyers 
to form a partnership whose activities included the delivery of legal 
services and to share legal fees.4 While the ABA House of Delegates 
rejected both sets of proposals by a wide margin, the debate has continued 
on the state level.5 The majority of states that have considered amending 
firm with competencies in more than one discipline or the coordinated activities of professionals in 
separate” entities. Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing 
Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217, 223 
(2000) (emphasis omitted). “‘Multidisciplinary partnership’ refers to the legal relationship among the 
principals of a professional services firm, serving essentially as a [proxy] for ownership and control.” 
Id. (emphasis omitted). Because both U.S. and foreign lawyers repeatedly express the fear that sharing 
ownership and control with nonlawyers will diminish the independence of a lawyer in providing 
services to a client, “MDP” as employed in this article refers to a multidisciplinary partnership. 
 3. The author served as the Reporter for the ABA Commission. For a complete description of 
the Commission’s activities, see http://www.abanet.org/cpr/multicom.html. The views expressed in 
this Article are entirely the author’s and should not be attributed to the Commission. The author would 
like to express her gratitude to the foreign lawyers, bar regulators, and bar association representatives 
who testified before the Commission and whose remarks helped to shape the views expressed in this 
article. References to the testimony and/or written comments submitted by these witnesses are cited by 
the witness’s name and the date of the testimony or written submission and a URL. The ABA is a non-
governmental entity. This article employs the terms “witness” and “testimony” for the sake of 
convenience; they do not refer to a formal attestation under oath. 
 4. ABA COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2000), 
at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/finalrep2000.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2002); ABA COMMISSION, 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1999), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ 
mdpfinalreport.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2002). 
 5. Technically speaking, the 1999 and 2000 Resolutions did not reject the Commission’s 
recommendations on their merits. The 1999 Resolution provided: 
 RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association make no change, addition or amendment to 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct which permits a lawyer to offer legal services through a 
multidisciplinary practice unless and until additional study demonstrates that such changes will 
further the public interest without sacrificing or compromising lawyer independence and the legal 
profession’s tradition of loyalty to clients. 
 The 2000 Resolution disbanded the Commission and adopted eight principles to guide the legal 
profession in any debate over amending the law governing lawyers to permit MDPs. The Resolution’s 
tenor was clearly hostile. Included among the principles were: 
7. The sharing of legal fees with nonlawyers and control of the practice of law by nonlawyers are 
inconsistent with the core values of the legal profession. 
8. The law governing lawyers, that prohibits lawyers from sharing legal fees with nonlawyers and 
from directly or indirectly transferring to nonlawyers ownership control over entities practicing 
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their codes of lawyer conduct to permit a lawyer and nonlawyer to practice 
in an MDP have rejected that proposal.6 MDP task forces and 
commissions in several states have recommended some changes to permit 
a limited MDP relationship and final action on these proposed changes is 
pending.7 New York has taken the lead by amending the New York 
Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility to permit a lawyer and 
nonlawyer to enter into an MDP relationship under certain circumstances.8  
In the debate at both the ABA and state level, the supporters and 
opponents of MDPs frequently defended their respective positions by 
referring to the establishment and regulation of MDPs abroad,9 particularly 
in the United Kingdom and several Western European countries.10 They 
clashed over the merits and demerits of the Big Five’s11 networks of 
relationships with foreign law firms. U.S. academics, with the notable 
exceptions of Professors Laurel Terry12 and Charles Wolfram13 and social 
law, should not be revised.  
Resolution 10F, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecom10f/html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002). 
 6. http://www.abanet.org/cpr (last visited Oct. 22, 2002). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See also John Caher, Multidisciplinary Practice Rules Adopted by State: New York Takes 
Lead on Lawyer-Nonlawyer Partnerships, N.Y.L.J., July 25, 2001, at 1; John Caher, Still Debated, 
MDP Arrives in New York, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 1, 2001, at 1; Anthony E. Davis, New Rules on Cooperative 
Business Arrangements with Non-Lawyers, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 6, 2001, at 3. 
 9. The author has previously addressed issues relating to the establishment and regulation of 
MDPs abroad in (1) the text and endnotes of various Commission papers, of which she was the 
principal drafter; and (2) her article, Daly, supra note 2. Some of the textual analysis and footnotes in 
this Article borrow directly from those sources.  
 10. Unless the Article’s text indicates to the contrary, “Western Europe” is used as a generic term 
for Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands. The organized bars in those 
countries have taken a prominent role in framing the ethical and regulatory issues relating to the 
establishment and regulation of MDPs. Other countries where these issues are also being debated 
include Canada and Australia. See, e.g., Legal Profession Amendment (National Competition Policy 
Review Bill), at http://www.lawsociety.com=au/page.asp?partid=470 (last visited Nov. 3, 2002) (Law 
Society of New South Wales); Guide to Application to Enter into a Multidiscipline Practice, at 
http://lsuc.on.ca/services/MDPintro_en.jsp (last visited Nov. 3, 2002) (Law Society of Upper Canada). 
 11. The “Big Five” is the term commonly used to refer collectively to Arthur Andersen L.L.P. 
[hereinafter Andersen], Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu L.L.P. [hereinafter Deloitte & Touche], Ernst & 
Young L.L.P. [hereinafter Ernst & Young], KPMG L.L.P. [hereinafter KPMG], and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers L.L.P. [hereinafter PwC]. For a fascinating study of the corporate structure of 
the Big Five firms and their relationship with their foreign law firm affiliates, see Jens Drolshammer, 
The Future Legal Structure of International Law Firms—Is the Experience of the Big Five in 
Structuring, Auditing and Consulting Organizations Relevant?, 2 EUR. J.L. REFORM 713 (2000). 
 12. Laurel S. Terry, MDPs, “Spinning,” and Wouters v. NOVA Comment: The Multi-
Disciplinary Practice of Certified Public Accountants and Lawyers, 52 CASE WEST. L. REV. 867 
(2002); Laurel S. Terry, German MDPs: Lessons to Learn, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1547 (2000); Laurel S. 
Terry & Clasing B. Houtman, Future Role of Merged Law and Accounting Firms: What If . . . ? The 
Consequences of Court Invalidation of Lawyer-Accountant Multidisciplinary Partnership Bans, in 
PRIVATE INVESTMENTS ABROAD—PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1998 
(1998). See also Laurel S. Terry, MDPs: Reflections from the U.S. Perspective, 8 INT’L J. LEGAL 
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scientists Bryant Garth and Carole Silver,14 have paid scant attention to 
MDP developments abroad. This Article examines the most significant of 
those developments and the lessons do they offer the legal profession in 
the United States as the MDP debate continues.15 Part II provides a 
snapshot of the history of MDPs in France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom and the responses of the organized bars at the national and 
international level. Part III explores how the structure, culture, and ethics 
of the legal professions in Western Europe contributed to the rapid growth 
of MDPs. Part IV examines the economic threat that the Big Five’s legal 
networks posed to U.K. and Western European law firms prior to the 
criminal conviction of Andersen and the consequent disintegration of 
Andersen Legal, its law firm network.16 Part V offers some preliminary 
reflections on how Andersen’s demise will shape the future of MDPs in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Western Europe. The 
Conclusion connects that future to deeply embedded competing models of 
the legal profession. 
PROF. 151 (2001); Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the “No” Rule Become a New Rule, 72 
TEMP. L. REV. 869 (1999). 
 13. Charles W. Wolfram, Comparative Multi-Disciplinary Practice of Law: Paths Taken and Not 
Taken, 52 CASE WEST. L. REV. 961 (2002); Charles W. Wolfram, Multidisciplinary Partnerships in 
the Law Practice of European and American Lawyers, in LAWYERS’ PRACTICE & IDEALS: A 
COMPARATIVE VIEW 301 (John J. Barceló III & Roger C. Cramton eds., 1999). 
 14. Bryant G. Garth & Carole Silver, The MDP Challenge in the Context of Globalization, 52 
CASE WEST. L. REV. 903 (2002); Carole Silver, The Case of the Foreign Lawyer: Internationalizing 
the U.S. Legal Profession, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1039 (2002); Carole Silver, Globalization and the 
U.S. Market in Legal Services—Shifting Identities, 31 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1093 (2002). See also 
Richard L. Abel, Transnational Legal Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 737 (1994); David M. 
Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields 
and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407 (1994). 
 15. To keep the Article’s text a manageable length, the author assumes the reader’s general 
familiarity with the MDP debate in the United States. Readers seeking a fuller analysis should consult 
Business Law Symposium, Multidisciplinary Practice, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2001); 
Symposium, The Future of the Profession: A Symposium on Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 MINN. L. 
REV. 1083 (2000); Symposium, Multidisciplinary Practice, 20 PACE L. REV. 1 (1999).  
 16. Andersen Legal was an umbrella organization made up of law firms in approximately thirty-
six different countries. The law firms were independently owned and operated and did not share fees 
with one another or Andersen. However, the firms did agree to refer clients to one another on a non-
exclusive basis. Carolyn Hong, Law Firm Leaves Andersen Legal, N. STRAITS TIMES (Malaysia), Apr. 
18, 2002, at 2. 
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B. Five Models for Configuring an MDP Relationship Between a Lawyer 
and a Nonlawyer 
The organization and day-to-day operations of large businesses and the 
manner in which legal services are delivered to them have changed 
dramatically over the course of the last half a century. Of particular 
importance to the MDP debate is the emergence of global conglomerates 
selling goods and services around the world, the growing number of mid-
sized and small companies engaged in cross-border transactions, and the 
increased regulation of marketplace activities at the local, regional, 
national, and international level.17 These three phenomena have interacted 
to create a business environment in which a professional educated in a 
single discipline can rarely resolve a business client’s pressing problems. 
The problems’ solution usually requires the knowledge and skills of 
professionals in multiple disciplines. Little or no disagreement exists 
between MDP proponents and opponents about clients’ increased need for 
coordinated counseling by professionals in different disciplines. The MDP 
debate revolves around how to structure the legal relationship between a 
lawyer and nonlawyer professional.18 Commentators have addressed this 
 17. It is a serious mistake, especially in the United States, to examine MDP issues only as they 
relate to large law firms and their corporate clients. Many small law firms and consumer groups 
supported amending the rules of professional conduct and the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) 
statutes to permit lawyers to practice in MDPs. They argued that partnerships with nonlawyer 
professionals such as social workers, certified financial planners, and engineers would produce 
economic and efficiency benefits for both lawyers and individual clients. See Daly, supra note 2, at 
274 nn.242-50 and accompanying text. Because the risks and advantages of the delivery of legal 
services to individuals by MDPs have not been a major theme in the debate in Western Europe and the 
United Kingdom, this Article does not address that topic. Some commentators, however, have 
suggested that permitting fully integrated MDPs would provide “High Street” practitioners in the 
United Kingdom with a much needed economic boost. Alison Crawley, Written Remarks: Solicitors, 
Accountants and Multi-Disciplinary Practice the English Perspective, ¶ 6.1, at http://www.abanet.org/ 
cpr/crawley.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002). Ms. Crawley is the Head of Professional Ethics of the 
Law Society of England and Wales. The U.S. equivalent of a “High Street” solicitor is a “Main Street” 
lawyer.  
 18. Not all MDP proponents agree that the nonlawyer must be a “professional.” Some argue that 
the market alone should determine if an MDP’s clients are willing to purchase services from a 
nonlawyer, nonprofessional. Others argue that defining “professional” is an impossible exercise.  
 New York has stepped into the fray. The recent amendments to the Lawyer’s Code of Professional 
Responsibility charge the courts with the responsibility of establishing and maintaining a list of 
professions with whose members a lawyer may enter into “a cooperative business arrangement.” DR 
1-107(a)(1), N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.5-c(a)(1) (2002). To gain entry to the list, 
the profession must be composed of individuals who, with respect to their profession: 
(i) have been awarded a Bachelor’s degree or its equivalent from an accredited college or 
university; 
(ii) are licensed to practice the profession by an agency of the State of New York or the United 
States government; and  
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issue by proposing five configurations labeled “models”.19 But, as 
discussed more fully below, because of differences in legal cultures and 
regulatory systems, all five configurations are not equally available in each 
of the fifty states, the countries of Western Europe, and the United 
Kingdom. 
In the Cooperative Model, a lawyer and one or more nonlawyer 
professionals work together to solve a client’s problem. The lawyer and 
nonlawyer are employees or members of separate entities. They singly bill 
the client for their individual services. The client or the lawyer retains the 
nonlawyer professional.20  
In the United States, a variant on the Cooperative Model has evolved 
over the past twenty years. It is increasingly common for large law firms 
to employ nonlawyer professionals on their staffs to assist them in 
advising clients on litigation and transactional matters. Such nonlawyer 
professionals include economists, accountants, financial planners, 
engineers, and lobbyists.  
Law firms in Western Europe other than those in Germany have not 
traditionally employed nonlawyer professionals.21 The foreign firms’ 
practices until very recently have focused primarily on litigation.22 
Because of the manner in which litigation is conducted in the civil law 
system, a lawyer’s role in presenting evidence of a technical or scientific 
nature is quite limited, considerably lessening the need for a law firm’s 
employment of nonlawyer professionals. Transactional lawyers in foreign 
law firms have not pressed to hire nonlawyer professionals because the 
legal culture in which they were educated and practice considers the 
giving of advice on non-legal matters to fall outside the scope of a 
lawyer’s competence.  
The Command and Control Model “permits a lawyer to form a 
(iii) are required under penalty of suspension or revocation of license to adhere to a code of ethical 
conduct that is reasonably comparable to that of the legal profession. 
DR 1-107(b), N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.5-c(b). 
 19. The ABA Commission proposed the five models to facilitate discussion. See Commission on 
Multidisciplinary Practice, Hypotheticals and Models, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ 
multicomhypos.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Hypotheticals and Models]. Articles on 
MDPs frequently use the five models as a basis for discussion and analysis. See, e.g., John S. 
Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A 
Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 153-71 (2000). 
 20. See Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 19. 
 21. Germany is an exception to the extent that it has permitted partnership with and employment 
of a limited category of nonlawyer professionals (e.g., auditors, tax advisors, and patent attorneys). See 
infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 90-96, 222-24 and accompanying text. 
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partnership with a nonlawyer and to share legal fees subject to certain 
clearly defined restrictions.”23 Typical restrictions include requiring that 
the law firm or organization have as its sole or primary purpose the 
provision of legal services; the nonlawyer’s agreement to conform his or 
her conduct to the rules of professional conduct that govern a lawyer’s 
conduct; the lawyer’s agreement to supervise the nonlawyer; and a written 
acknowledgment of these conditions.24 The District of Columbia is the 
only jurisdiction in the United States that allows a lawyer to enter into a 
Command and Control relationship with a nonlawyer.25 While Western 
European countries, with the exception of Germany, do not permit such 
relationships,26 nations in other parts of the world do allow them.27 
In the Ancillary Business Model, a law firm operates a separate 
business that provides nonlegal professional services.28 Those services are 
usually related to the niche practices that the firm has developed. For 
example, a firm with a significant insurance coverage practice might 
establish a consulting business to advise companies on how to choose a 
policy and manage disputes over coverage. Its nonlawyer members might 
include risk managers, environmental engineers, insurance analysts and 
public adjusters.29  
Ancillary businesses are a familiar phenomenon in the United States.30 
Likewise, solicitors may establish them in the United Kingdom.31 The 
existence of ancillary businesses reflects a pro-active, entrepreneurial bar. 
Ancillary businesses are unknown in Western Europe, reflecting a static, 
technocratic approach to the practice of law.32 That approach is manifested 
 23. Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 19. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2000). 
 26. See infra notes 135-49 and accompanying text. 
 27. Both New South Wales, Australia and Canada permit a lawyer to enter into a Command and 
Control Relationship with a nonlawyer. Professional Regulation Task Force Report: Structure of Law 
Firms at 19-20 (May 1997), at http://lawsociety.com.au/uploads/filelibrary/102153/8235 (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2002); Guide to Application to Enter into a Multidiscipline Partnership (June 30, 1999), at 
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/services/MDPintro_en.jsp (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).  
 28. See Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 19. 
 29. For an announcement of the establishment of precisely such an ancillary business, see 
Today’s News; Update, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 2000, at 1 (describing Andersen Kill Insurance Services). 
 30. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.7 (2000); Daly, supra note 2, at 244-47; Lowell 
J. Noteboom, Professions in Convergence: Taking the Next Step, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1359, 1364-74 
(2000); John Gibeaut, CASH BOUGHS: Since the ABA’s Rejection of Multidisciplinary Practices, More 
Law Firms are Branching Out into Law-Related Businesses, A.B.A.J., Feb. 2001, at 50; Michael D. 
Goldhaber, As ABA Debates, MDPs Are Spreading: NLJ Survey Finds Lots of Firms Already Have 
Ancillary Businesses, NAT’L L.J., July 10, 200, at A1. 
 31. See infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 32. In Germany, a lawyer is permitted to be a legal professional and an accounting professional 
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by the doctrine of incompatible professions. In Western Europe’s legal 
culture, there is a long standing and powerful tradition that rejects the 
concept of the practice of law as a business activity. Closely allied to that 
tradition is the view that a lawyer should not engage in business activities 
regardless of whether they are related or unrelated to the practice of law.33 
For example, the Italian code of conduct denies lawyers the right to 
“engage in business” or “accept full or part-time employment” in nonlegal 
businesses.34 For a considerable length of time in Germany, “[m]ost 
business and commercial activities were found to be incompatible, 
including those in which the applicant did not hold a ‘higher [i.e., 
nonsubordinate] position.’”35 Animating the doctrine of incompatible 
professions is the fear that economic dependency on an activity other than 
the practice of law will eventually erode a lawyer’s independence.  
In the Contractual or Side-by-Side Model, a law firm and a 
professional services firm formally agree to work together to provide 
multidisciplinary services to clients. Both remain independent entities. The 
law firm is controlled and managed by lawyers; the professional services 
firm by nonlawyers. Each accepts engagements from clients who do not 
engage the other.36 The Contractual or Side-by-Side Model is the one most 
frequently used by the Big Five in Western Europe and the United 
simultaneously. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 33. The doctrine’s precise substance differs from country to country, but the general prohibition 
is the same. See Richard L. Abel, Lawyers in the Civil Law World, in 2 LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE 
CIVIL LAW WORLD, 1, 25 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988) [hereinafter THE CIVIL 
LAW WORLD]; Jean Brucher, The Legal Professions in Luxembourg, in THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS IN 
THE NEW EUROPE 241, 248 (Alan Tyrrell & Zahd Yaqub eds., 2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter THE LEGAL 
PROFESSIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE]; Remo Danovi, The Legal Professions in Italy, in THE LEGAL 
PROFESSIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE, supra, at 223, 228-29; Roger G. Goebel, Lawyers in the European 
Community: Progress Toward Community-Wide Rights of Practice, in RIGHTS, LIABILITY, AND 
ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE 239, 297 n.173 & 301-02 (Mary C. Daly & Roger J. 
Goebel eds., 1995) [hereinafter RIGHTS, LIABILITY, AND ETHICS]; Takis Kommatas, The Legal 
Profession in Greece, in THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE, supra, at 177, 185-86; Pierre 
Sanglade & Hēlène Cohen, The Legal Professions in France, in THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS IN THE NEW 
EUROPE, supra, at 127, 135. 
 34. MAURO CAPPELLETTI ET AL., THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 93 (1967); see Majda Barazzutti, 
Italy, in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A COMPARATIVE OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 
APPLICABLE TO THE CROSS-BORDER PRACTICE OF LAW 94, 96 (Edwin Godfrey ed., 1995) [hereinafter 
LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS]; Ottavio Campanella, The Italian Legal Profession, 19 J. LEGAL PROF. 59 
(1994-95). 
 35. William B. Fisch, Varieties of Professional Independence, in LAWYERS’ PRACTICE & 
IDEALS, supra note 13, at 363, 368. The federal constitutional court eventually rejected all but two 
criteria for determining if an activity was incompatible with the practice of law: “insufficient time for 
active practice of law and clear probability of a conflict of interest between the other activity and the 
duties of a lawyer.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 36. See Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 19. 
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Kingdom.37 The structure of the relationship depends in part on the 
personnel and geographic size of the contracting law firm.38 
Until recently, there was no publicly acknowledged instance of a 
contractual relationship in the United States between a law firm and a Big 
Five firm. The ethical prohibition found in most state codes of conduct 
banning the use of a trade name had the practical effect of discouraging 
such relationships because it prevented the two entities from advertising 
their relationship. The prohibition deprived law firms of the opportunity to 
benefit from “branding” their legal and nonlegal services.39 
In 1999, five partners from the Atlanta and Washington, D.C. offices of 
King & Spalding broke away from the firm, formed a separate law firm in 
Washington, D.C., and announced the new firm’s affiliation with E&Y.40 
The Washington D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct do not contain a 
prohibition on the use of trade names. E&Y reportedly agreed to furnish 
the firm a significant amount of start up capital and lease it space in a 
building E&Y owned. In exchange, the law firm agreed to be known as 
McKee Nelson Ernst & Young.41 The two firms stated that they were 
separate entities, but many commentators regarded the affiliation as a 
major step by the Big Five42 toward the eventual establishment of a 
 37. See, e.g., Neil Cochran, Oral Remarks, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/cochran2.html (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2002); Neil Cochran, Statement, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/cochran1.html (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2002); Summary of the Testimony of Gerard Nicolay, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ 
nicholay1198.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2002). See also infra notes 86-188 and accompanying text. 
See generally John E. Morris, King Arthur’s March on Europe, AM. LAW., June 1998, at 49. 
 38. In one variation, a Big Five firm contracts with a single law firm with only one office. In 
another, it contracts with a single law firm with several branch offices. And in still another, it contracts 
with separate, independent law firms, some of which might have only a single office, others of which 
might have several branch offices. See, e.g., Emily Barker, More Accounting Firms Eye the U.K. Legal 
Market, AM. LAW., Apr. 1996, at 13 (describing the arrangements between Arnheim & Co. and Price 
Waterhouse and Garrett & Co. and Arthur Andersen).  
 39. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
 40. Press Release, Ernst & Young (Nov. 3, 1999) (on file with author). The Washington, D.C. 
Rules of Professional Conduct have no bar on the use of trade names. 
 41. Id. 
 42. While not as controversial as the formation of McKee Nelson Ernst & Young, other steps 
taken by the Big Five appear to serve the same goal. For example, in 1999 KPMG created a strategic 
alliance with several members of SALTNet, a network of state and local tax lawyers. See Deregulation 
Sparks Significant State Tax Reform, TRANSFORMATIONS (KPMG Spring 2000), at 8, available at 
http://www.us.kpmg.com/RutUS_prod/Documents/12/BoardAdvisorsMtg.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 
2002); Arian Campo-Flores, Dream Tax Team, AM. LAW., Sept., 1999, at 18; Tom Herman, KPMG 
Joins Forces with a Group of State and Local Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1999, at A1; Brenda 
Sandburg, MoFo Allies with Accounting Giant, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 9, 1999, at 2; Ritchenya A. Shepherd, 
Why MOFO Teams with KPMG, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 23, 1999, at A12. In 1997, PwC entered into a 
strategic alliance with Miller & Chevalier, a prominent tax boutique that had the practical effect of 
encouraging PwC’s clients to retain the law firm for the clients’ tax-related litigation. See The Big Six 
Move in, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 1997, at 25. 
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multidisciplinary partnership that includes legal services.43 In 2001, the 
firm changed its name to McKee Nelson.44 The most likely explanation for 
the change is its announced intention to open a branch office in New York 
City.45 New York prohibits a law firm from practicing under a trade 
name.46 But it does not prohibit a law firm from entering into a contractual 
relationship with a professional services firm. It has recently adopted a 
new rule governing “cooperative business arrangements.”47  
While the precise terms of the contract between a law firm and a Big 
Five firm are almost never disclosed publicly, testimony before the 
Commission by foreign lawyers and regulators and commentary in the 
popular and legal press suggests that they include (1) the law firm 
agreeing to identify its affiliation with the professional services firm on its 
letterhead and business cards, and in its advertising; (2) the law firm and 
the professional services firm agreeing to refer clients to each other on a 
nonexclusive basis; and (3) the law firm agreeing to purchase goods and 
services from the professional services firm (e.g., staff management, 
communications technology, office space, and equipment).48 
In the Fully Integrated Model, the law firm and the professional 
services firm are not separate entities. There is one professional services 
firm divided into, for example, accounting, business consulting, and legal 
units.49 Its advertisements emphasize “‘a seamless web’ of services”50 and 
“one-stop shopping,” aiming at potential clients in need of 
multidisciplinary advice.51 Businesses with problems that require only the 
 43. See Jonathan Groner & Siobhan Roth, Envisioning A Big 5 Law Firm: Ernst & Young 
Positioning to Offer Full Legal Services, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 25, 1999, at 1; Siobhan Roth, How Ernst 
& Young Gave Birth to a Law Firm, RECORDER, Nov. 11, 1999.  
 44. Press Release, Growing Fast, McKee Nelson Gives Up Ernst & Young Name, May 23, 2001, 
at http://mckeenelson.com/newsandevents/inthenews/news.cfm?id=1; Andrew Crooke, Ernst & Young 
Re-brands US Law Arm for NY Launch, LMG: People/firms newsletter, www.legalmediagroup.com 
(May 22, 2001); Geanne Rosenberg, E&Y Forges into the Lead with New York-Based Law Group, 
NAT’L L.J., Jan. 15, 2001, at B7. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 1200.5-g, 1200.5-c (2002). 
 47. See id. § 1200.5-c (2002). See also supra note 8. 
 48. See supra notes 43-44; Morris, supra note 37, at 52. 
 49. See Hypotheticals and Models, supra note 19. 
 50. Id. 
 51. The proponents of one-stop shopping typically argue: 
The cost savings from which a consumer may benefit include a reduction in the following costs: 
search, contracting, co-ordination, monitoring, and information costs. . . . There are fixed costs 
associated with search, verification, and monitoring if the user contracts across several non-
integrated suppliers of complementary services. These will be reduced if these services are 
provided by one integrated firm. The buyer can then either monitor randomly across the services 
and impute the verified quality to the entire integrated firm and/or rely on substantial brand name 
capital that would be at risk if the integrated firm were to fail to deliver on its promised quality. 
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services of a single unit are, of course, free to engage that unit.  
The supporters and detractors of the Fully Integrated Model frame their 
arguments in remarkably similarly terms on both sides of the Atlantic 
Ocean. The supporters contend that the efficiencies and synergies inherent 
in a single, integrated entity point to this model as the ideal one for 
delivering multidisciplinary services to clients.52 Thus, they urge the repeal 
of the rules of lawyer conduct and the UPL statutes that prevent lawyers 
and nonlawyers from forming partnerships and sharing legal fees. The 
detractors resist these changes, countering that the likelihood of a lawyer’s 
loss of independent professional judgment is too great; the risk of 
disclosing confidential client information, too substantial; and the danger 
of conflicts of interest, too jeopardous.53  
II. A SNAPSHOT OF MDPS IN FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND THE RESPONSES OF THE ORGANIZED BARS54 
In any discussion of MDPs in foreign countries, commentators almost 
certainly refer to three jurisdictions: France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom. France is the country where the Big Five made their greatest 
gains in establishing the capability to deliver legal services.55 Germany has 
the largest economy in Western Europe, is a leading international center 
for corporate finance, and has a long history of permitting lawyers to 
practice with nonlawyers.56 The United Kingdom is the home of the 
“Magic Circle” law firms that have dominated international legal practice 
CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES: A CONSUMER 
WELFARE PERSPECTIVE 3-4 (1999) (on file with the author). See also id. at 20- 27 (reporting the 
results of a survey of corporate clients that purchased legal services from law firms affiliated with the 
Big Five). This study contains an extensive economic analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
MDPs. It was prepared under the direction of Professor Michael Trebilcock of the University of 
Toronto Faculty of Law. 
 52. Id. at 17-18. 
 53. Id. at 22-30. 
 54. In 1999, the President of the New York State Bar Association appointed a Special Committee 
to study MDP issues. The Committee conducted an exhaustive review of MDPs outside the United 
States. Drawing on multiple sources, many of them in French and German, it published up-to-date 
information not generally available in English. See NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE ON THE LAW GOVERNING FIRM STRUCTURE AND OPERATION, PRESERVING THE CORE 
VALUES OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION: THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000) [hereinafter THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS].  
 The author commends the Special Committee for its contribution to the MDP debate and 
acknowledges that much of the information and structure of the analysis in Part II is drawn from The 
Place of Multidisciplinary Practice in the Law Governing Lawyers. 
 55. See infra notes 86-87, 131-32. 
 56. See infra notes 137-38, 145. 
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since the end of World War II; both the Office of Fair Trading and the 
regulatory bodies that govern the conduct of lawyers have extensively 
reviewed MDP issues; and the resolution of those issues is likely to have a 
significant impact on the legal profession in other parts of the world, 
especially Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and Canada.57 In France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom, the Big Five have almost exclusively 
used the Contractual or Side-by-Side Model to structure their relationships 
with law firms.58 
The description that follows provides a snapshot of MDP practice in 
the three countries and discusses those aspects of the history and 
organization of their legal professions that are most pertinent to the debate 
in the United States. Two caveats are in order, however. First, the analysis 
is not exhaustive. It eschews the details in favor of a more general 
overview.59 Second, because it is a snapshot, it does not capture the 
dynamism of the marketplace for corporate legal services or the multiple 
forces at play.60 U.S. law firms are expanding abroad in response to the 
relatively flat domestic market for legal services. Their entry into the 
marketplace generally ratchets up the level of competition. These firms, 
moreover, are not only selling legal services, but they are also introducing 
a different conception of the role of lawyers in business transactions. 
Foreign lawyers who have studied or worked in the United States and 
subsequently returned home to the jurisdiction of their licensure are also 
bringing with them a new proactive style of lawyering.61 In-house lawyers 
are assuming a new identity.62 All of these changes are acting 
synergistically to reshape the structure and practice of foreign legal 
professions. 
 57. See infra notes 162-80. 
 58. If the ethical barriers to the fully integrated model were removed, the Big Five would almost 
certainly transform those relationships from a contractual one to a corporate one. See Drolshammer, 
supra note 11, at 732 & 767 n.30. For an analysis of the economic weaknesses in the contractual 
model and the corresponding strength of the fully integrated model, see CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, 
supra note 51, at 7-8. 
 59. In most instances, the sources identified in the supporting footnotes contain more 
particularized descriptions. 
 60. For an insightful analysis of these forces, see Garth & Silver, supra note 14; Silver, The Case 
of the Foreign Lawyer: Internationalizing the U.S. Legal Profession, supra note 14; Silver, 
Globalization and the U.S. Market in Legal Services—Shifting Identities, supra note 14. 
 61. As a result of this dynamism, French and German lawyers are becoming more instrumentalist 
and less technocratic in delivery legal services to corporate clients. See infra notes 204-39 and 
accompanying text. 
 62. See generally Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a 
Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057 (1997). 
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A. The European Union and the Regulation of MDPs 
The regulation of the bar in the member states of the European Union 
involves a complex interplay between the principles of the Treaty of 
Rome, as amended,63 and the institutions of the European Union, on the 
one hand, and the jurisdiction of the member states to regulate the practice 
of law, on the other.64 Generally speaking, the member states are free to 
regulate the practice of law by statute, administrative pronouncement, or 
lawyer code of conduct provided that the regulations’ substantive content 
does not violate the Treaty.65 The Establishment Directive66 specifically 
acknowledges the member states’ jurisdiction over the relationship 
between a lawyer and an MDP. It provides: 
[A] host Member State, insofar as it prohibits lawyers practising 
under its own relevant professional title from practising the 
profession of lawyer with a grouping in which some of the persons 
are not members of the profession, may refuse to allow a lawyer 
registered under his home-country professional title to practice in its 
territory in his capacity as a member of his grouping. The grouping 
is deemed to include persons who are not members of the profession 
if  
—the capital of the grouping is held entirely or partly, or  
—the name under which it practises is used, or  
—the decision-maker power in that grouping is exercised, de facto 
or de jure,  
 63. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. 
 64. For a comprehensive analysis of this topic, see GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY LAW 713-43 (2002); Daly, supra note 2, at 229-30 & nn.39-43; Roger J. Goebel, The 
Liberalization of Interstate Legal Practice in the European Union: Lessons for the United States?, 34 
INT’L LAW. 307 (2000); D. Bruce Shine, The European Union’s Lack of Internal Borders in the 
Practice of Law: A Model for the United States?, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 207 (2002). 
 65. The European Court of Justice has invalidated bar regulations on several occasions on 
precisely this ground. See Daly, supra note 2, at 230 n.39 (citing Case 107/83, Ordre des Avocats au 
Barreau de Paris v. Klopp, [1984] E.C.R. 2971, 1 C.M.L.R. 99; Case 33/74, van Binsbergen v. 
Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnljverheld, [1974] E.C.R. 1299, 1 C.M.L.R. 298, Case 2/74, Reyners 
v. Belgium, [1974] E.C.R. 631, 2 C.M.L.R. 305). 
 66. A directive is a legally binding act that may be issued by the Council of Ministers, the 
European Parliament (acting jointly with the Council), or the European Commission. For a more 
complete description of a directive and the function of the three institutions, see BERMAN ET AL., supra 
note 64, at 33-56, 75-76. 
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—by persons who do not have the status of lawyers within the 
meaning of article 1(2).67 
The Establishment Directive does not validate a member state’s ban on 
lawyers affiliating with nonlawyers in an MDP. It simply imposes a rule of 
equal treatment. If a host country prohibits its own lawyers from being 
members of an MDP, a lawyer from another member state who is 
otherwise permitted to offer legal services in the host country may not 
offer those services through an MDP.  
The Directive does not address the underlying question whether a bar 
association’s ban on affiliations between a lawyer and a nonlawyer 
violates the Treaty of Rome, as amended. Amid a great deal of 
controversy, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has recently concluded 
that such a ban is permissible.68 The Court’s decision does not compel a 
bar association to either impose a ban or enforce an existing one. Member 
States remain free to set their own public policy regarding the ownership 
and management of MDPs. 
Regulation SV 93 adopted by The Netherlands Bar Association 
(NOVA) allowed Dutch lawyers to enter into a partnership with certain 
categories of nonlawyers. Partnerships between lawyers, on the one hand, 
and notaries and tax advisors, on the other, were permitted. Partnerships 
between lawyers and auditors were prohibited. When bar regulators 
disapproved two separate, proposed affiliations between a Dutch lawyer 
and an auditing firm, the lawyers challenged the decisions, essentially 
arguing that SV 93 constituted a prohibited restraint of trade and violated 
the provisions of certain EC treaties guaranteeing the lawyers’ right of 
establishment and freedom to provide services.69  
The trial court rejected those arguments. The lawyers appealed, but the 
Dutch Supreme Court declined to reach the merits. It referred the appeals 
to the ECJ. In order to resolve the question of the ban’s validity, the Court 
had to first decide whether NOVA was “an association of undertakings” 
 67. Council Directive 98/5, art. 11, cl. 5, 1998 O.J. (L 77) 36. 
 68. J.C.J. Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten. ECJ Judgment, 
Case C—309/99, 2002 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 186 (Feb. 19, 2002). The opinion is also available at 
http://curia.u.int/en/jurisp/index.htm.  
 69. For a more complete analysis of the Wouters decision and a description of its procedural 
history, see Terry, MDPs, “Spinning,” and Wouters, supra note 12; Terry & Houtman, supra note 12. 
Also helpful to an understanding of the decision are the remarks of Anthony Huydecoper, the 
Advocate General to the Supreme Court of The Netherlands. Symposia, 2002 Otto L. Walter Lecture: 
Multidisciplinary Practice and the European Court of Justice, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 175 
(2002) (passim). 
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within the meaning of Article 85(1) of Treaty.70 The Court concluded that 
it was such an association because in adopting SV 93 NOVA was acting 
“as the regulatory body of a profession, the practice of which constitutes 
an economic activity.”71 In reaching this conclusion, the Court explicitly 
rejected two of NOVA’s principle arguments as to why its conduct fell 
outside the scope of Article 85(1): first, that the provision of legal services 
did not constitute an economic activity within the article’s meaning; and 
second, that even if the provision of legal service was an economic activity 
NOVA’s regulation was connected to the exercise of the powers of a 
public authority.72  
The Court then considered whether SV 93’s ban on lawyer-auditor 
partnerships had an adverse economic effect on competition and might 
affect trade between Member States.73 It had little difficulty in reaching an 
affirmative conclusion. The Court’s analysis should have ended at this 
point. The application of firmly established principles of EC competition 
law inescapably pointed to a judgment that SV 93’s ban was unlawful. 
Much to the amazement of European commentators,74 however, the ECJ 
applied a “rule of reason” test, holding  
a national regulation such as the 1993 Regulation adopted by a body 
such as the Bar of the Netherlands does not infringe Article 85(1) of 
the Treaty, since that body could reasonably have considered that 
that regulation, despite effects restrictive of competition, that are 
 70. Article 85(1)provides:  
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements 
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which 
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply: 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts. 
 71. Wouters, ¶ 58. 
 72. Id. ¶ 57. 
 73. Id. ¶¶ 80-96. 
 74. For a more elaborate discussion of the Court’s “very, very surprising turn,” see Otto L. 
Walter Lecture, supra note 69, at 189-90.  
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inherent in it, is necessary for the proper practice of the legal 
profession, as organised in the Member State concerned.75 
The Court did not require any showing that the absolute ban on 
partnerships between lawyers and auditors was the least restrictive means 
available to preserve the “proper practice of the legal profession.”76 It 
accepted at face value NOVA’s assertions that the ban was necessary to 
protect “the duty to act for clients in complete independence and in their 
sole interest . . . the duty to avoid all conflict of interest and the duty to 
observe strict professional secrecy.”77 Finally, it rested its holding in part 
on a perceived incompatibility between the role of a lawyer and that of an 
auditor. A lawyer “guarantees that all steps taken in a case are taken in the 
sole interest of a client.”78 In contrast, an auditor “undertake[s] an 
objective examination and audit of . . . clients’s accounts, so as to be able 
to impart to interested third parties [the auditor’s] personal opinion 
concerning the reliability of those accounts.”79 
The impact of the Wouters decision on existing MDPs and the possible 
establishment of new ones is not clear. It certainly gives a green light to 
bar regulators in countries, like The Netherlands, that have previously 
adopted such a ban. They are now free to enforce the prohibition without 
fearing that they are possibly violating EU competition law. The Wouters 
 75. Wouters, ¶ 110. 
 76. A remand for the purpose of exploring the question of the proportionality of the ban was 
clearly one option available to the Court. The Advocate General had suggested that the ECJ order a 
remand for this purpose. That the Court ignored the suggestion is surprising. There is no U.S. 
counterpart to the Advocate General. The Advocate General is an experienced lawyer who serves as a 
law clerk to the ECJ. His responsibility is “acting with complete impartiality and independence, to 
make, in open court, reasoned submissions on cases before the Court of Justice, in order to assist the 
Court in the performance of [its] task.” Article 222. His opinions are a matter of public record and are 
highly regarded. For a more complete description of the role o the Advocate General, see BERMAN ET 
AL., supra note 64, at 61-63. 
 The Court’s decision in Wouters departs from the Advocate General’s in two important respects. 
First, the Advocate General specifically refused to apply a rule of reason to SV 93’s ban. See Opinion 
of the Advocate General Philippe Leger, Case C-309/99, Wouters v. NOVA, (July 10, 2001), available 
at http://curia.eu.int/en/jurisp/index.html. The Court did, upsetting well-established jurisprudence. See 
supra note 70 and accompanying text. Second, he concluded that a remand was necessary because “the 
Court was not in possession of sufficient evidence to settle the question itself of the proportionality of 
the contested Regulation.” Id. ¶ 196. A remand would have provided an opportunity for the 
challengers to show that other, less restrictive alternatives were available. The Court’s decision is 
silent on the question of taking further evidence, strongly suggesting that any remand is for ministerial 
or procedural purposes only. See Terry, supra note 69, at 891 n.71. Why the Court rejected the 
Advocate General’s recommendation is not known.  
 77. Wouters, ¶ 100. 
 78. Id. ¶ 102. 
 79. Id. ¶¶ 102 & 104. MDP opponents in the United States and elsewhere repeatedly raised this 
objection as well. 
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decision may also encourage MDP opponents in countries without a ban to 
urge the adoption of one.  
Assessing the decision’s impact is especially difficult in light of 
Andersen’s demise and the fire-sale of the law firms previously affiliated 
under the umbrella of Andersen Legal.80 Andersen’s demise may 
encourage MDP opponents to use Wouters to attack existing relationships 
between law firms and the Final Four and stop new relationships from 
forming. Their most likely argument is that the auditing arm of Andersen 
lost its independence in the Enron affair because it wanted to preserve the 
lucrative assignments of its consulting arm.81 They would then charge that 
an MDP-type relationship between a lawyer and a nonlawyer, especially 
an auditor, poses an identical threat to the lawyer’s exercise of 
independent professional judgment.82 
On the other hand, MDP opponents may conclude that the Enron affair 
and other prominent accounting scandals in the telecommunications 
industry have sufficiently exposed the threat to independence that the 
marketplace will automatically devalue the alleged benefits of one-stop 
shopping. 
Finally, assessing the impact of Wouters is difficult because the Law 
Society of England and Wales is still debating precisely how to amend the 
Solicitor’s Code of Conduct to permit solicitors to form MDP-type 
relationships with nonsolicitors.83 That decision will significantly 
influence the MDP debate around the world. Wouters may become 
irrelevant for all practical purposes, if the Law Society fully blesses the 
Contractual or Side-by-Side Model and/or the Fully Integrated Model. The 
Law Society’s response to Wouters was noticeably cool.84 
 80. See infra notes 275-85 and accompanying text. 
 81. Enron paid Andersen $25 million in auditing fees and $27 million for consulting fees in 
2000. Nanette Byrnes et al., The Enron Scandal, BUS. WK., Jan. 28, 2002, at 44. One study of 563 
publicly traded companies showed that on the average they paid $2.69 in consulting fees for every 
$1.00 in audit fees. Another study reported that twenty-six of the thirty companies that are components 
of the Dow Jones Industrial Average paid more in consulting fees than auditing fees to the Big Five 
firms responsible for auditing those companies’ financial statements. See Ken Brown, Accounting 
Industry Fights Calls for ‘Audit Only’ Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2002, at C1; Laura Pearlman, 
Leftovers Anyone?, AM. LAW., June 2001, at 21; Jonathan Weil & Jeffrey A. Tannenbaum, Big 
Companies Pay Audit Firms More for Other Services, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2001, at C1. 
 82. E.g., Suzanne Kapner, Enron’s Many Strands: Connections; Enron Fiasco Leads European 
to Reconsider Ties between Accounting and Legal Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2002, at 28; Nikki 
Tait & Michael Mann, A set-back for the one-stop shop: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PARTNERSHIPS: A 
European court has stirred the ‘conflict of interest’ debate over links between lawyers and 
accountants, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 25, 2002, at 14.  
 83. See infra notes 150-88 and accompanying text. 
 84. In response to the decision, the Law Society issued the statement, “We support the principle 
of MDPs as part of our commitment to improve access to legal services and choice for consumers.” 
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B. France 
As noted earlier, the Paris Bar was instrumental in focusing the 
attention of the U.S. legal profession on MDPs.85 The cries of alarm raised 
by the Paris Bar are readily understandable. MDPs present more of a threat 
to traditional law firm practice in that country than they do in Germany, 
the United Kingdom, or the United States. Until the collapse of Andersen 
Legal, each of the Big Five had an active legal services practice in France 
conducted through affiliated law firms.86 Those firms grew to be among 
the largest law firms in that country.87  
The explanation for the establishment and growth of MDPs in France is 
multi-faceted. It requires an understanding of the divided structure of the 
country’s legal profession, the geographic limitations on the scope of the 
bar’s regulation, and the government’s active involvement in issues 
relating to the structure of the legal profession and affiliations between 
members of the legal profession and nonlawyers.  
France, like many other Western European countries, has a divided 
legal profession.88 Of particular importance in the MDP debate are the 
distinct professions of avocat, avoué, and notaire, each of which is 
governed by separate statutes, codes of conduct, and regulatory bodies.89 
Appreciating the differences among these and other legal professionals 
and the limitations imposed on their practices and forms of business 
organizations is a critical first step in understanding the opportunities that 
the Big Five aggressively pursued.  
For hundreds of years, the avocat has been the central figure in the 
Tait & Mann, supra note 82. 
 85. See supra note 1. 
 86. The associated law firms are Archibald Andersen (Andersen), H.S.D. [hommes, stratégie, 
droit] (E&Y), Deloitte & Touche Juridique et Fiscal (Deloitte & Touche), Thomas & Associés and 
Fiduciare Juridique et Fiscale de France—Fidal (KPMG) [hereinafter Fidal]; and Landwell & Associes 
(PwC). See THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 192 n.12. 
 87. See infra note 131-32 and accompanying text. 
 88. See infra notes 214-26 and accompanying text. 
 89. A complete description of their activities is beyond the scope of this article. See generally 
Ronald P. Sokol, Reforming the French Legal Profession, 26 INT’L LAW. 1025 (1992); Sanglade & 
Cohen, supra note 33, at 127-33. Their functions may be summarized as follows: avocats are the legal 
professionals who represent clients in litigation and advise on dispute resolution; avoués are the legal 
professionals who represent clients in appellate litigation; and notaires are legal professionals whose 
functions relate to the preparation and execution of legal documents such as trusts, wills, and 
agreements for the sale and purchase of real estate. Sanglade & Cohen, supra note 33, at 127-28. See 
also THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 
54, at 193 n.16. 
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pantheon of the French legal profession.90 Avocats generally limited their 
services to those associated with litigation.91 Business counseling was left 
to nonlawyers or other legal professions.92 The history of MDPs in France 
begins in 1970 when the French Parliament enacted legislation that added 
the title of conseil juridique to the list of officially recognized legal 
professionals.93 The primary function of the conseil juridique was to 
counsel clients on business matters.94 Like each of the other legal 
professions, the conseil juridique was separately regulated and had its own 
code of conduct.95 Significantly absent from the regulations and code was 
a prohibition on affiliating with nonlawyers or sharing legal fees with 
nonlawyers. The Big Five and their predecessors seized this opportunity 
and eagerly courted conseil juridique to join their staffs.96  
Over the next twenty years, the conseil juridique were successful in 
establishing their competence to advise on a wide range of business 
activities. In contrast, very few avocats established a remunerative 
business law practice.97 Clients continued to view avocat firms as 
providing primarily litigation services.  
In 1990, the French Parliament took a second stab at reforming the 
legal profession.98 The new legislation put avocat firms at an even greater 
disadvantage. It merged the legal professions of avocats and conseil 
juridique into the single profession of avocat and authorized other 
professionals to advise clients on legal matters ancillary to their principal 
activities.99 The Big Five and their predecessors used this legislation as a 
springboard to expand their legal services practices. The legislation, 
moreover, encouraged other organizations to enter the marketplace, 
including banks, insurance companies, and unions.100  
What the legislation omitted was probably as harmful as what it 
affirmatively permitted. The avoué remained a separate legal professional. 
There was no provision permitting partnership between or among avocats, 
 90. Sanglade & Cohen, supra note 33, at 128. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 194-95. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 195. 
 96. Id. at 195-96. 
 97. Id. at 196. 
 98. See THE PLACE OF MULTIDISIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 197. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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avoués, or notaires. Lawyers were not given a monopoly over activities 
such as providing legal advice, drafting legal documents, or even 
representing clients in litigation.101  
The 1990 legislation dealt the avocat law firms an additional blow. 
Among the Big Five’s competitive advantages over law firms is 
“branding.” The Big Five can offer a multitude of services under the 
umbrella of a single name.102 Each time they competently perform a 
service for a client the reputational capital of the entire firm as well as the 
unit providing the service increases. Media campaigns benefit the entire 
firm not just the service units whose particular skills they extol. Given the 
large size of the Big Five’s media budgets, their ability to reach potential 
new clients far exceeds that of any law firm.103 In France, the advantage’s 
impact was multiplied because of the legal profession’s cultural hostility 
to any and all forms of self-aggrandizement. The avocats wholeheartedly 
disapproved of advertising as unprofessional and supported a regulatory 
environment that either outlawed it entirely or limited it severely.104  
The French Parliament passed two separate statutes reforming the legal 
profession on the same day in 1990. Each contained a provision relevant to 
the type of branding permitted when a law firm was affiliated with a Big 
Five firm. Article 67 of the first statute appeared on its face to limit to five 
years the length of time an avocat (formerly a conseil juridique) could 
refer to an affiliation with a professional services firm.105 Article 2 of the 
second statute allowed an entity to “add, before or after its name or 
insignia of the association, the group or professional network, be it 
national or international, of which that entity is a member.”106 Article 2, 
however, was subject to article 67. The Big Five and French bar 
associations have been fighting over the interpretation of articles 67 and 2 
for the past twelve years.  
Only one law firm associated with a Big Five firm, 
 101. Id.  
 102. THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 200. 
 103. U.S. law firms are far head of foreign law firms on the learning curve with respect to 
advertising. Compared to the Big Five, however, U.S. firms are novices. It is ironic that “[t]o direct 
high-powered marketing campaigns, [U.S. firms] are bringing aboard experts from the corporate 
sector, particularly accounting firms.” Martha Neil, Learning How to Ad, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2001, at 42, 
44.  
 104. See also infra notes 230-39 and accompanying text. 
 105.  Art. 67, Law No. 90-1259 of J.O., Jan. 5, 1991 of Dec. 31, 1990. See THE PLACE OF 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 54, at 200-01. 
 106. THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 200-01 (citing Art. 2, para. 4, Law No. 90-1258 of Dec. 31, 1990).  
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PricewaterhouseCoopers Juridique and Fiscal, has ever changed its 
name.107 It rechristened itself “Landwell.” That change, however, was 
neither a victory for the French bar associations nor a benefit for the 
avocat firms. Many of the law firms affiliated with PwC around globe had 
kept their local name and tagged along some reference to PwC on the 
lawyers’ business cards and the firms’ letterheads. To better brand its legal 
services competency and global reach, PwC had all its affiliated firms 
adopt the name “Landwell.”108  
The other Big Five firms did not follow PwC’s lead. Assuming that the 
French bar associations’ interpretation of articles 67 and 2 is correct, Fidal, 
which is the legal services arm of KPMG, may escape the articles’ reach 
because the firm’s name does not refer to the affiliation.109 E&Y and 
Deloitte & Touche are subject to the jurisdiction of the Bar of Nanterre 
(Hauts-de-Seine).110 That Bar’s membership has been dominated by 
avocats associated with the law firms affiliated with the Big Five.111 It is 
not surprising therefore to discover that the Bar of Nanterre has displayed 
no interest whatsoever in forcing those law firms to comply with article 
67’s five-year limitation.112 The French law firms affiliated with the large 
accounting firms consequently continue to publicize the affiliations, 
benefitting from the derivative branding.  
The French bar has attempted to use the rules of ethics as a weapon in 
its war with the Big Five on at least two occasions, once in 1998 and again 
in 1999. In 1998, the National Council of the Bars113 issued a decision that 
 107. See THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 202-03. 
 108. Jean Eaglesham, Pwc Reorganizes Network of Law Firms, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 11, 
1999, at 4. Prior to the name change, PwC’s legal network operated in forty-two countries under 
twenty different names. While the network’s restructuring will not allow the member law firms to 
circumvent local bar rules against sharing fees or entering into a partnership with a nonlawyer, it will 
provide them with economic advantages such as sharing costs related to marketing and training. Id. 
 109. THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 203. 
 110. Id. See supra note 86. Until its disintegration, Archibald, Andersen Legal was also subject to 
the Bar of Nanterre’s jurisdiction. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. The National Council of the Bars is an organization composed of eighty lawyers whose 
principal functions are to harmonize the rules of professional conduct that have been separately 
adopted by the one hundred and sixty-three local bar associations, present the profession’s views to the 
French government, and establish standards in accordance with government directives. Richard Tyler, 
War of the Words, THE LAW., Aug. 4, 1998, at 15; see also Sanglade & Cohen, supra note 33, at 131; 
John M. Grimes, Note, “Une et Indivisible”—The Reform of the Legal Profession in France: The 
Effect on U.S. Attorneys, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1757, 1772 (1992). As this description 
suggests, the French government plays a much more active role in the organization of the avocat 
profession than either the state or federal governments do in the United States with respect to the legal 
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ostensibly recognized the right of avocats to form a partnership with 
nonlawyer professionals subject to certain conditions.114 The Big Five 
accused the National Council of using its rulemaking authority for 
protectionist purposes. However, they did not reject the decision 
entirely.115 While the National Bar Counsel’s 1998 decision was far from a 
ringing endorsement of avocats practicing in MDPs, its issuance is not 
hard to understand. First, the prior efforts to limit affiliations between law 
firms and the Big Five had failed miserably. MDPs were now solidly 
ensconced on the legal landscape. Second, the Big Five firms had hired a 
large number of law school graduates as stagiaires at a time when the 
traditional avocat firms could not absorb them.116 Without the Big Five’s 
assistance, a political and professional crisis would have ensued. 
In 1999, the National Council, in anticipation of the Nallet Report 
discussed below, adopted a new article 16 to the code of conduct.117 It 
provided that if a law firm was affiliated with an MDP, all the MDP’s 
members had to conform their conduct to the avocats’ ethics rules.118 The 
ostensible purpose for article 16’s adoption was to insure the avocats’ 
independence and the avoidance of conflicts of interest.119 PwC challenged 
the National Council’s authority. The Paris Court of Appeal subsequently 
ruled that the National Council lacked the authority to regulate the conduct 
of MDPs.120  
The French government also speaks with a loud voice in the MDP 
debate. In 1999, it asked Henri Nallet, a member of Parliament and a 
former Minister of Justice, to study the reform of the French legal 
profession. Illustrative of this active role is Decree No. 91-1197 of Nov. 27, 1991, J.O., Nov. 28, 1991, 
P. 15, 502 (dictating the basic structure of the avocat profession). 
 114. THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 108-09. 
 115. Among the recommendations most strenuously objected to were those that would have 
required MDPs to disclose to the local bar association the legal and financial relationship between the 
avocats and the nonlawyer members of the MDP. Tyler, supra note 113; see also THE PLACE OF 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 54, at 208-09.  
 116. A lawyer in France must undergo a two-year period of supervised training. THE PLACE OF 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 54, at 207-08; 
Sanglade & Cohen, supra note 33, at 135. 
 117. Art. 16, Conseil National des Barreaux, Décision à Caractèrenormatif no. 1999-001 (Mar. 26-
27, 1999), at 45-46, cited in THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS, supra note 54, at 204. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See generally Synopsis of Henri Ader’s notes, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ader.html (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2002).  
 120. French Court Overrules MDP Ban, LEXISLEGAL, THE LEGAL INSIDER, 
http://www.lexislegal....ews/storyBin/20010207/Story487.asp; Pwc Triumphs Against Paris Bar in 
Landmark MDP Ruling, THE LAW., Feb. 5, 2001, at 2. 
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profession and affiliations among members of the different legal 
professions and between legal and nonlegal professionals.121 Both the 
proponents and opponents of MDPs in France can take solace in some of 
the recommendations in M. Nallet’s Report. For example, he would permit 
avocats and nonlegal professionals to enter into a legally cognizable 
relationship, but deny them the right to share legal fees.122 He would create 
a new regulatory body for policing the ethical conduct of MDPs but have 
that body principally draw upon the existing codes of conduct and the 
disciplinary bodies in place.123 He considers the system of conflicts 
monitoring in existing MDP firms to be adequate and not in need of 
change, but he would impose restrictions on advertising by MDPs similar 
to those now placed on avocats.124  
Two sets of recommendations suggest that he, like the French bar 
associations in general, is worried about the impact of the MDP 
relationship on a lawyer’s independence. First, the Report affirms the 
“absolute independence” of lawyers and auditors from one another.125 It 
states that each profession within the MDP should control its professional 
strategy, management, and admission of partners.126 It emphasizes that 
avocats in an MDP must remain subject to rule of professional secrecy.127 
Second, it proposes that the contracts establishing the terms of the 
relationship between the lawyer and nonlawyer professional be filed with 
the new and existing regulatory bodies and be available for review by the 
MDP’s clients.128 This will presumably enable the reviewers to judge for 
themselves whether the terms of the relationship threaten the lawyer’s 
independence.129  
The French Parliament has not acted on the recommendations in the 
Nallet Report. One reason for its inaction may be that the Report contained 
 121. THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 192, 211-15. Lurking ominously in the backdrop to the Nallet Report is not only the French 
firms’ weaknesses in competing with law firms affiliated with the Big Five but also the significant 
inroads made by U.S. and U.K. firms into the marketplace for sophisticated legal services. Ben Cook, 
A Storm Brewing, LEGAL BUS., Apr. 2001, at 76. 
 122. THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 212-13. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 214. 
 125. Id. at 213. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 214. 
 128. Id. at 213. 
 129. Id. at 213-14. See also Ader, supra note 119; Sydney M. Cone, III & François Berbinau, The 
Nallet Report and Multidisciplinary Practice, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/nallet.html (last visited Apr. 
1, 2002) (summarizing the Nallet Report’s recommendations with respect to MDPs). 
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a number of other controversial recommendations such as allowing 
passive investments in law firms and amending certain tax laws applicable 
to lawyers and law firms.130 Another reason may be that the Report 
presented its recommendations as general principles not concrete 
measures. In France, as in the rest of the world, the devil is in the details. 
In short, the current legal and regulatory status of MDPs in France is 
murky and confused. The Big Five and their affiliated law firms used the 
disarray to their advantage. By 2001, four of the six largest law firms in 
France were affiliated with Big Five firms.131 Two of the affiliated firms 
ranked first and second in terms of size, and both were significantly larger 
than the French firm in third place. The two affiliated firms that ranked 
fourth and sixth were almost the same size as the French firms that 
immediately precede them in the rankings.132 
B. Germany 
Until very recently, the principle purpose of a German legal education 
was to form lawyers who would enter careers associated with the judiciary 
and the civil service.133 Educators paid little attention to the education of 
lawyers who would represent corporate clients in litigation or transactional 
work.134 Like the French legal profession, the German legal profession is 
 130. THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 214-15. 
 131. The six largest law firms in France are: Andersen (378 lawyers), Landwell (360 lawyers), 
Francis Lefebvre, Bureau (270 lawyers), HSD Ernest & Young (261 lawyers), Gide Loyrette Nouel 
(235 lawyers), and Deloitte & Touche Juridique & Fiscal (230 lawyers). France’s Largest Firms, AM. 
LAW., Nov. 2001, at 91.  
 132. Id. 
 133. Hilmar Fenge et al., Legal Education and Training in Europe: Germany, 2 INT’L J. LEGAL 
PROF. 95, 103-05 (1995); Jutta Brunnée, The Reform of Legal Education in Germany: The Never-
Ending Story and European Integration, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399, 400 (1992); see generally Juergen R. 
Ostertag, Legal Education in Germany and the United States—A Structural Comparison, 26 VAN. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 301, 309-10 (1993). 
 134. This deficiency has prompted prominent corporate law firms in Germany to sponsor that 
country’s first private law school. Leading Firms Back German Private Law Schools, EUR. LEGAL 
BUS., Jan./Feb. 2001, at 8. One commentator has noted: 
There is little literature available on . . . the teaching of legal business planning and formation . . . 
These publications do not really address international circumstances, and are more oriented 
towards two-party contractual relationships and not towards corporate structures. At least on the 
continent of Europe there is a lack of conceptualization of the planning and structuring of legal 
transactions. The international dimension of these legal activities, which are core activities in the 
“international practice of law”, is thus unconceptualized either. The “decision”-oriented legal 
education has not been adequately supplemented by an “action” or “creation”-oriented legal 
education. 
Drolshammer, supra note 11, at 721 n.9. 
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also divided and consists in part of a Rechtsandwalt, who performs 
functions similar to those of a trial or deal lawyer, a Patenanwalt who 
represents clients in connection with procuring and enforcing patents, and 
a Notar who is a public official whose functions include the supervision of 
the execution of certain documents.135 In some instances, an individual 
may be a member of more than one legal profession. The accounting 
profession is also divided, and an individual may be a member of more 
than one accounting-related profession. Complicating these divisions even 
further is that under certain circumstances an individual may 
simultaneously be a member of both a legal profession and an accounting-
related profession.136  
MDP relationships in Germany are either fully integrated or 
contractual. Fully integrated relationships are permitted but only among 
certain designated categories of legal and accounting-related professionals. 
Only Rechtsandwalt may join a fully integrated MDP, and the nonlawyer 
members must be auditors, certified bookkeepers, tax advisors, tax agents, 
or patent lawyers.137 Membership is generally limited to natural persons 
and passive investment is prohibited.138  
Because fully integrated MDPs have drawn the most vocal protest from 
the opponents of MDPs both in the United States and abroad, the question 
of their acceptance in Germany merits further inquiry. The answer is 
rooted in the German legal culture. To begin with, the statute that 
establishes the principle of professional secrecy is essentially the same for 
a Rechtsandwalt and the members of the accounting-related professions 
with whom the Rechtsandwalt may join in an MDP. There is an 
accountant-client privilege, just as there is an attorney-client privilege.139 
Professional independence is a core value for each professional. Auditors 
in Germany, moreover, do not have the same obligation of disclosure of 
client wrongdoing as they do in other countries.140 The codes of conduct 
that govern the members of the different professions in an MDP are 
 135. See Gerhard Manz & Anne MacGregor, The Legal Professions in Germany, in THE LEGAL 
PROFESSIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE, supra note 33, at 143, 167. 
 136. See THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 237; Terry, supra note 12, at 1553-56. 
 137. See THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 249-51; Terry, supra note 12, at 1561-62. The rules of professional conduct permit 
Rechtsandwalt to enter into non-integrated relationships with other professionals such as architects and 
engineers. THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 260-61. 
 138. See id. at 253. 
 139. Id. at 257. 
 140. Id. 
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substantively similar in many respects.141 If the rules are inconsistent and 
cannot be reconciled, the strictest rule that is in the public interest is 
applied.142  
In short, the “ethical gap” between lawyers and accountants that MDP 
opponents have cited in the United States and other countries is generally 
missing in Germany. Fully integrated MDPs are therefore seen as 
acceptable vehicles for the delivery of legal and nonlegal services by 
professionals in different disciplines. Further contributing to the 
acceptance of fully integrated MDP firms is their size and the control 
exercised therein by the Rechtsandwalt. Fully integrated MDP firms tend 
to be small in size. Consequently, law firms do not perceive them as an 
immense competitive threat the way they would a fully integrated Big Five 
firm. A very large number of the fully integrated MDP firms are lawyer-
controlled, lessening the possibility of any concern that the accounting-
related professionals could interfere with a Rechtsandwalt’s exercise of 
independent professional judgment.143  
In light of the restrictions discussed above on the types of professionals 
who may be members of a fully integrated MDP,144 the Big Five have had 
to enter into a contractual relationship with law firms in Germany in order 
to participate in the marketplace for the delivery of legal services.145 Until 
1989, partnerships among lawyers in different cities were prohibited.146 
There was no similar restraint on the professionals who worked for the Big 
 141. Id. 
 142. See testimony of Hans-Jüürgen Hellwig, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/hellwig2.html (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2002); written statement of Hans-Jüürgen Hellwig, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ 
hellwig1.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2002); testimony of Thomas O. Verhoeven, http://www.abanet.org/ 
cpr/Verhoeven.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2002); THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 54, at 257-59. 
 143. Testimony of Hans-Jüürgen Hellwig, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/Hellwig.html (visited Apr. 
1, 2002); written statement of Hans-Jüürgen Hellwig, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/hellwig.html (visited 
Apr. 1, 2002); THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, 
supra note 54, at 262-64. 
 144. Other restrictions also come into play. For example, accounting firms are statutorily 
forbidden to give legal advice. Four of the law firms affiliated with the Big Five were structured as 
limited liability companies. Lawyers must constitute a majority of the shareholders in a limited 
liability company. THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, 
supra note 54, at 266. 
 145. The affiliated law firms are: Andersen Luther Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH (Andersen), 
Menold Herrlinger Rechtsanwälte (E&Y), PwC Veltins Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH (PwC), 
WEDIT Deloitte Touche (Deloitte Touche), Raupach & Wollert-Elmendorff 
Rechtsanwaltsgesellschaft mbH (Deloitte Touche), KPMG Treuhand & Goerdeler GmbH (KPMG). Id. 
at 262 n.291. For a detailed description of their organization and history, see Terry, supra note 12, at 
1576-87. 
 146. See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text; see also THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 54, at 264-65. 
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Five, however. Over the course of time, the Big Five established offices 
across Germany and developed relationships with the leading commercial 
lawyers in those cities. When the ban on multi-city partnerships between 
lawyers was struck down, the Big Five moved strategically to encourage 
the law firms with which they had been working to consolidate.147 The 
consolidation gave the merged law firms a broader set of practice groups, 
facilitated the integration of technology between the newly merged firm 
and the Big Five firm with which it was affiliated, and generally increased 
the efficiency of the delivery of legal services by the Big Five and their 
affiliated law firms.  
The Big Five also moved strategically with respect to the recruitment 
of lawyers. In a pattern that they have followed elsewhere, they made a 
concerted effort to persuade well respected, leading lawyers to join their 
affiliated firms.148 The Big Five’s international capabilities were a very 
attractive selling point, especially for lawyers interested in cross-border 
transactions and mergers and acquisitions.149  
C. The United Kingdom150 
The principle legal professions in the United Kingdom are those of a 
barrister and a solicitor. While the precise divide between the two has 
become less clear in recent years,151 for the purposes of this Article the 
essential distinction is that barristers are trial lawyers and solicitors, 
transactional lawyers.152 Bar regulations mandate that barristers may have 
 147. THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 264-65. 
 148. See infra notes 263-64 and accompanying text; Daly, supra note 2, at n.47 and accompanying 
text. See also Landwell Boosts Corporate Department, LEGAL BUS., Nov. 2001, at 22; Mostyn-
Williams Ditches Shearman for Landwell, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 2001, at 22; Norton Rose Loses 
Second Partner to MDP, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 2000, at 5; Thieffry Quits Norton Rose for Andersen 
Legal, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 2000, at 4. A common adage in today’s marketplace for legal services 
is that “clients hire lawyers not law firms.” A lawyer who quits a law firm to join an MDP is certainly 
likely to encourage his or her clients to jump ship too. See Andersen Legal’s Client Win Leaves 
Nortons Nonplussed, LEGAL BUS., Dec. 2001/Jan. 2002, at 16. 
 149. THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 265-66. 
 150. For an excellent general overview of the MDP debate in the United Kingdom and the ethical 
and regulatory changes required if the proponents of MDPs carry the day, see Elspeth Deards, MDPs: 
A Cause for Concern or Celebration, 8 INT’ L.J. LEGAL PROF. 125 (2001). 
 151. Recent reforms have given solicitors rights of audience in all courts. See Access to Justice 
Act, 1999, C.22, § 36 (Eng.); Higher Courts Qualifications Regulations (2000); Courts and Legal 
Services Act, 1990, C.41, § 27 (Eng.). See generally OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES XV (2001).  
 152. See generally Philip Wareham, Solicitors in England and Wales, in THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS 
IN THE NEW EUROPE, supra note 33, at 334; Zand Yaqub, Barristers in England and Wales, in THE 
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only other barristers as partners.153 That ethical rule is so ingrained in the 
U.K. legal culture that it was never seriously challenged during the debate 
over MDPs.154  
The MDP debate focused on whether and to what extent solicitors 
should be permitted to enter into a partnership or share legal fees with 
nonsolicitors.155 That debate took place in a legal environment in which 
solicitors did not have monopoly rights156 and regularly competed with 
businesses and entities operated by nonlawyers. 
[W]hereas solicitors have been restrained in challenging the Bar, lay 
competitors have been far more aggressive in invading the domain 
of solicitors. Banks and trust companies, accountants, real estate 
agents, companies, and trade unions all perform solicitors’ work for 
their customers, employees, and members. The lay public also 
seems less tolerant of the solicitors’ monopoly than they are of the 
barristers’ exclusive right of audience . . . .157 
Certain solicitors practice rules, whose content was similar to the 
lawyer codes of conduct in the United States, also shaped the debate. 
LEGAL PROFESSIONS IN THE NEW EUROPE, supra note 33, at 319; Richard L. Abel, England and 
Wales: A Comparison of the Professional Projects of Barristers and Solicitors, in LAWYERS IN 
SOCIETY: AN OVERVIEW 39-91 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S. C. Lewis eds., 1995). 
 153. CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES, Rule 207 (6th ed. 1998). 
 154. See generally testimony of Dan Brennan, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/Brennan.html (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2002). Mr. Brennan is the General Counsel of the Bar of England and Wales. While the 
ban has not been “seriously challenged,” there have been calls for its repeal. See e.g., DIRECTOR 
GENERAL OF FAIR TRADING, OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONS (2001). 
Compare A. Arden, The Case for Partnership, THE LAW., Dec. 6, 1999, at 1; A. Arden, When 
Partnerships Are the Answer, THE LAW., Jan.10, 2000, at 15 with J. Hirst, Partnerships Offer No 
Benefits, THE LAW., Dec. 13, 1999, at 29. 
 155. The regulation of solicitors in the United Kingdom is split along geographic lines. As their 
names suggest, the Law Society of England and Wales and the Law Society of Scotland and Northern 
Ireland govern the conduct of solicitors who practice within those respective territories. References to 
the MDP debate are to the debate within the Law Society of England and Wales. Because its 
jurisdiction includes London, it governs almost all of the large U.K. solicitor firms. The British 
government and press give close attention to its positions on legal issues. The legal professions in the 
Commonwealth countries also look to it for leadership. The Law Society of Scotland and Northern 
Ireland is generally opposed to amending the rules of solicitor conduct to permit solicitors to share 
with fees with nonsolicitors or to form a partnership with them. THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 54, at 216-17. 
 156. British law distinguishes between “reserved” and “unreserved” work. Litigation, advocacy, 
conveyancing, and probate work make up the classification of reserved work. Unreserved work is 
“other legal work which anyone is allowed to do.” LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, MULTI-
DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES-WHY? WHY NOT?, § 2.1 (1998), at http://www.lawsoc.org.uk/dcs/ 
fourth_tier.asp?section_id=922 (last visited Apr. 1, 2002). Within this framework, “any person or 
business can, for a fee, give legal advice or prepare a will.” Id. § 2.2. See generally Alison Crawley, 
Written Remarks, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/crawley.html (visited Oct. 22, 2002). 
 157. LAWYERS IN SOCIETY, supra note 152, at 56. 
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Practice Rule 7, for example, barred solicitors from sharing legal fees or 
entering into a partnership with a nonsolicitor.158 Practice Rule 4 
reinforced the bar by specifically stating that except in very limited 
circumstances a solicitor employed by a nonsolicitor could have as his or 
her client only the employer.159 While these rules on their face are 
straightforward, they are complicated by the fact that a solicitor may enter 
into a ancillary business-type relationship with a nonsolictor.160 A solicitor 
may organize or join a separate business and serve as a “business advisor.” 
However, he or she may not use that separate business to provide legal 
services.161 These principles resemble U.S. rules that govern a lawyer’s 
conduct in connection with an ancillary business.  
The MDP debate in the United Kingdom began in earnest with the 
Thatcher government’s efforts to introduce greater competition in the 
market for legal services.162 In 1986, the Office of Fair Trading issued the 
Entities Report, suggesting that relaxing the ban on partnerships between 
solicitors and nonsolicitors was in the public interest.163 In 1990, the 
Parliament passed legislation repealing the statutory prohibitions that 
barred solicitors from forming a partnership with nonsolicitors.164 
However, the Law Society failed to amend Practice Rules 4 and 7, thus, 
the ethical bar remained in place. Solicitors continued to practice in one of 
the four traditional structures: “a partnership or sole practice,” “an 
unincorporated practice,” “an in-house employee,” or “a multi-national 
 158. Rule 7 provides: 
A solicitor shall not share or agree to share his or her professional fees with any person except: 
(a) a practicing solicitor  
(b) a practising lawyer of another jurisdiction 
(ba) a non-registered European lawyer partner with whom partnership is permitted by paragraph 
(6)(c) of this rule;  
(bb) a body corporate wholly owned and controlled, for the purpose of practising law, by lawyers 
with sub-paragraph (b) above . . . . 
(c) the solicitor’s bona fide employee, which provision shall not permit under the cloak of 
employment a partnership prohibited by paragraph (6) of this rule; or 
(d) a retired partner or predecessor of the solicitor or the dependents or personal representatives of 
a deceased partner or predecessor. 
SOLICITORS PRACTICE RULES Rule 7 (2002). 
 159. Id. Rule 4.01-.09. 
 160. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 161. See LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 156, at §§ 5.2.5, 7.6.2.-.3. 
 162. See generally MJ Quinn, Note, Reform of the Legal Profession in England and Wales, 12 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 237 (1991). For a general overview of the Thatcher government’s 
proposals, see the 1989 Green Papers.  
 163. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, REPORT ON RESTRICTIONS ON THE KIND OF ORGANIZATION 
THROUGH WHICH MEMBERS OF THE PROFESSIONS MAY PROVIDE THEIR SERVICES (1986). 
 164. The Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, C.41, § 66 (repealing Solicitors Act § 39 (1974). 
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practice.”165 
The Law Society triggered the current MDP debate in the United 
Kingdom in 1998 when it published the consultation paper, Multi-
Disciplinary Practices, Why? . . . Why not?.166 The paper extensively 
discussed the pro’s and con’s of amending the practice rules to permit 
MDPs. The Law Society subsequently formed a Working Group whose 
purpose was “[t]o take forward a review of MDPs to ensure that 
restrictions on the business vehicle/organisation through which solicitors 
practice, are the minimum necessary in the public interest and do not stand 
in the way of solicitors’ business development planning.”167 
The Working Group first decided that in conducting the review it 
would place the burden of proof on the proponents of the status quo.168 It 
then formulated seven preliminary conclusions to guide subsequent 
analyses.169 Many of those conclusions resembled the principles that 
guided the ABA Commission in its decision-making analysis.170 
With respect to the merits of the MDP debate, the Working Party 
proposed two interim practice models that it believed could be 
implemented immediately and would not require legislative approval. The 
first was a “Legal Practice Plus” model in which a solicitor firm could 
 165. LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, supra note 156, at § 5.1. A multi-national practice 
is a structure composed of a partnership or recognized body and registered foreign lawyers who share 
in the practice’s ownership. Id. 
 166. Id. In 1987, the Law Society issued a consultation paper on MDPs in which it reported that 
fifty-four percent of the solicitors who had responded to a Law Society survey thought that the ban on 
MDPs should be amended to permit solicitors and nonsolicitors to enter into a command and control 
relationship. Nonetheless, the Law Society objected to the Thatcher government’s efforts to repeal the 
statutory ban on MDPs. LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES: 
PROPOSALS FOR THE WAY FORWARD, A PRELIMINARY REPORT FOR THE DEBATE § 3 (1999), at 
http://lawsoc.org.uk/stage.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2002) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT].  In 1993, 
it again surveyed its membership. The percentage favoring MDPs dropped to forty-three percent. Id. 
§ 4. In 1996, the Council of the Law Society, its governing body, decided to revisit the question of 
MDPs. Id. § 5. 
 167. Id. at § 12. 
 168. The ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice took the same position in its initial 
Recommendation and Report. It subsequently modified that position and conducted its inquiry as if 
each side bore the burden. 
 169. Among the conclusions were that any decision would have to balance a solicitor’s interest in 
providing “any legal service through any medium to anyone” with “the necessary safeguards to protect 
the public interest;” that the core principles to be preserved were “independence, freedom of choice, 
conflict of interest, confidentiality;” and that “transparency will be important—the client must know 
what services have been provided and by whom.” PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 166, § 21. 
 170. Compare id. with ABA COMM. ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE 
OF DELEGATES (2000), at http://abanet.org.cpr.mdpfinalrep2000.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2002); ABA 
COMM. ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1999), at 
http://abanet.org.cpr/mdpreport.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2002). 
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have one or more nonsolicitor partners.171 A quid pro quo was extracted, 
however. Each nonsolicitor partner would have to enter into special 
contract with the Law Society, and the solicitor(s) in such a firm would 
have to assume “extra responsibilities.” Furthermore, the nonsolicitor 
partners could never hold a majority interest in the firm. Although a Legal 
Practice Plus solicitor firm was limited to supplying “services only of a 
kind which are normally provided by solicitors practising as solicitors,”172 
the Law Society did not regard that limitation as unduly restrictive because 
“the scope of solicitors’ services are already broad . . . and are becoming 
increasingly so.”173 The Legal Practice Plus model is a variant on the 
Command and Control Model discussed earlier.174  
The second was a “Linked Partnership” model in which a solicitor firm 
“link[s], for example, with an accountancy practice,” and the two linked 
entities share fees.175 The Working Party expressed more hesitancy about 
the feasability of the Linked Partnership model than the Legal Practice 
Plus’s. It left unresolved, for example, the question whether the ban on fee 
sharing should be modified only for “certain specified alliances, or more 
generally.”176 It also pointed out that the issues of passive investment and 
solicitor/auditor conflicts, among others, were left unresolved.177  
The Council of the Law Society substantially adopted the Working 
Group’s conclusions and recommended that the Legal Practice Plus and 
Linked Partnerships be considered by the full membership.178 The Legal 
Practice Plus recommendation subsequently encountered an unexpected 
obstacle, however. The Law Society received a legal opinion from its 
counsel that 
[t]he Law Society may not lawfully seek to regulate NSPs under the 
1974 Act. Also there are real dangers that a court would conclude 
that the Law Society cannot lawfully purport to regulate NSPs by 
contract. 
 171. LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PRACTICE WORKING 
PARTY—THIRD INTERIM REPORT (2000) (on file with author). 
 172. Id. § 4.19. 
 173. Id. § 4.20. 
 174. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
 175. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 166, ¶  22.2. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. ¶ 23. 
 178. LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES MDP WORKING GROUP, FOURTH INTERIM REPORT 
at 2, at http://www.lawsoc.org.uk/des.fourth_tier.asp?section_id+4773 (last visited Nov. 3, 2002). 
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Because of section 9(1) of the 1985 Act, and section 24(1) of the 
1974 Act, an incorporated LLP MDP would be unlawful. Only 
primary legislation would change this.179 
The legal opinion prompted the Law Society to seek the statutory 
changes necessary to implement its Legal Practice Plus recommendation 
and appoint another working party to reevaluate its prior proposals.180 To 
date, no further information has been disseminated publicly on the 
progress that is being made in accomplishing these goals. 
In the United Kingdom, as in France, the government has pressed for 
change. The Office of Fair Trade is a major participant in the MDP debate. 
Its mission is “[t]o make sure that competition works well in markets for 
goods and services, so as to make business more efficient, and benefit 
consumers.”181 The office first roiled the waters with the Entities Report in 
1986.182 That Report played a major role in persuading Parliament to 
repeal the statutory ban on partnerships between solicitors and 
nonsolictors. The Office of Fair Trading monitors closely the Law 
Society’s policy positions on MDPs and is a strong advocate for reform. It 
operates on the principle that  
[t]he Government considers the range of choice available to users of 
legal services in England and Wales should not be limited unless 
there are strong public interest reasons to the contrary, and that 
restrictions on competition between solicitors should be no greater 
than is necessarily adequate to safeguard the interests of their 
clients.183 
In weighing the public interest, it rejects the proposition that problems 
of “conflict of interest and professional secrecy [are] insuperable.”184 
Moreover, it views MDPs as strengthening the ability of both accounting 
and law firms to compete in the global marketplace. “If a major UK law 
firm and accountancy firm can join together to sell a good product in 
Poland, why should we put sand in the wheels to prevent them doing 
so?,”185 asked the Director of Competition in an important policy 
 179. Id. at Annex A at § 45 (reprinting Joint Opinion, In the Matter of The Law Society and Multi 
Disciplinary Practice for Solicitors). “NSP” refers to nonsolicitor partner. 
 180. Id. at 6. 
 181. Margaret Bloom, Opportunities and External Constraints on Legal Business (July 2, 1997) 
(on file with author). Ms. Bloom was the Director of Competition Policy, Office of Fair Trading. 
 182. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 183. Bloom, supra note 180, at 2. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
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statement in 1997. 
In March 2001, the Office of Fair Trading issued a major report, 
Competition in Professions, in which it again addressed the drag on 
competition resulting from the Solicitors Practice Rules 4 and 7.186 It noted 
somewhat ominously “I welcome the fact that the Law Society is currently 
at an advanced stage in considering proposals for liberalisation. I look for 
progress on this within 12 months.”187 In the conclusion, it was even more 
direct: “We will take action after this grace period if necessary, or earlier if 
there is no evidence of a willingness to make changes.”188  
Given the Office of Fair Trading’s preference for avoiding direct 
conflict, it is likely to take no precipitous action as long as the Law 
Society is acting in good faith to obtain the necessary legal authority to 
implement its Legal Practice Plus recommendation. At the same time, 
however, it is likely to exert pressure on the Law Society to flesh out its 
Linked Partnership recommendation.  
D. The Response of International Bar Associations to MDPs 
In light of the Big Five’s global ambitions with respect to the delivery 
of legal services, it is not at all surprising that bar associations dedicated to 
promoting the rule of law across national borders would add their voices 
to the MDP debate. The position of three such organizations, the Council 
of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union (CCBE),189 the 
International Bar Association (IBA),190 and the Union Internationale des 
 186. OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONS ¶¶ 29-32 (2001). 
 187. Id. at 13. 
 188. Id. ¶ 55. 
 189. The CCBE is 
the officially recognised pan-European professional organisation in the European Community, 
which includes the national organisations representing the legal profession (bars and law societies) 
from the Member States of the European Union and the Member States of the European 
Economic Area, as well as observer delegations from other European countries. The CCBE is 
established in order to act as a joint body on behalf of the Bars and Law Societies of the States of 
the EEA in all maters [sic] involving the application of the European law. The objective of the 
CCBE is to co-ordinate the views, policies and activities of the Bars and Law Societies in the EEA 
in their common dealing with the European Community, EEA, and EFTA institutions. 
1 J. CCBE CENT. & E. EUR. COUNTRIES 2 (2000), at http://www.ccbe.org/uk/uk.htm (last visited Apr. 
1, 2001); see generally John Toulmin, A Worldwide Common Code of Professional Ethics?, in 
RIGHTS, LIABILITY AND ETHICS, supra note 33, at 207, 207 n.1. It has played a leadership role in the 
creation of European Union law respecting the delivery of legal services across the Member States’ 
borders. See generally Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the European Community’s Legal Ethics 
Code Part I: An Analysis of the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1993). 
 
 190. The IBA is “a dual membership organisation, comprising 16,000 individual lawyers and 180 
Bar Associations and Law Societies.” International Bar Association, Introduction to the IBA, at 
http://www.ibanet.org/aboutiba/index.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2002). Its goals are: “To promote an 
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Avocats (UIA)191 merit particular attention. Because of their status and 
prestige, these organizations (rather than national and local bar 
associations)192 are likely to take the lead in future discussions with 
international regulators who are now turning their attention to the question 
of whether professional rules against partnership and fee sharing with 
nonlawyers constitute impermissible trade barriers.193 
The CCBE’s views on MDPs have evolved cautiously over time. It 
twice adopted a declaration strongly opposing them, once in 1993 and 
again in 1996.194 A majority of the Member State delegations endorsed a 
resolution in 1998 that would have softened the tone of the opposition, but 
that resolution fell short of the required supermajority vote.195 Its current 
position remains solidly anti-MDP: “CCBE consequently advises that 
there are overriding reasons for not permitting forms of integrated co-
operation between lawyers and non-lawyers with relevantly different 
professional duties and correspondingly different rules of conduct.”196  
exchange of information between legal associations worldwide[;] To support the independence of the 
judiciary and the right of lawyers to practise their profession without interference[;] Support of human 
rights for lawyers worldwide through its Human Rights Institute.” Id.  
 191. The UIA is a dual membership organisation comprised of thousands of individual lawyers 
and 250 bars and associations. It is “primarily an association of lawyers with an interest in defending 
the profession and its future in the national and international context.” Union Internationale des 
Avocats, What Is the UIA?, at http://www.uianet.org/english/e_what_uia.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 
2002). Its core objectives include: 
To promote the basic principles of the legal profession as defender of citizen’s [sic] rights. 
To participate in the development of legal knowledge and practice in all fields of law all over the 
world. 
To contribute towards the establishment of international legal order based on the principles of 
human rights and justice between nations, through the law, and in the cause of peace.  
To cooperate in an organisation enjoying consultive status with national or international 
organisations with similar objectives. 
To establish at an international level permanent relations and exchanges between Bars, Law 
Societies, and their members. 
To defend the interests of members of the legal profession and study the problems arising in the 
role and practice of the legal profession, particularly on an international level. 
Id. 
 192. The only likely exceptions to this observation are the ABA and the Japan Federation of 
Lawyers. Those organizations and the CCBE convened a forum on transnational practice in 1998 in 
anticipation of action by the WTO. See Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Paris Forum on the 
Transnational Practice for the Legal Profession, 18 DICK. J. INT’L L. 1 (1999). 
 193. See generally Laurel S.Terry, GATS’ Application to Transnational Lawyering and Its 
Potential Impact on U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, 34 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 989 (2001).  
 194. CCBE, DECLARATION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PARTNERSHIPS (adopted unanimously on 
Nov. 29, 1996) (on file with the author).  
 195. Summary of the Testimony of Michel Gout, President, Council of the Bars and Law Societies 
of the European Union, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/gout1198.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2002). 
 
 196. CCBE, POSITION OF CCBE ON INTEGRATED FORMS OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN LAWYERS 
AND PERSONS OUTSIDE THE LEGAL PROFESSION, Adopted in Athens on November 12, 1999, at 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss2/5
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To justify its opposition, the CCBE raises objections identical to those 
raised by the ABA and bar associations in the United Kingdom, France, 
and Germany: the threat to professional independence, the likelihood of 
substantial conflicts of interest, and the undermining of the confidentiality 
of client communications.197 The problem with the CCBE’s position is 
two-fold: first, it never defines “integrated co-operation.” The term is 
ambiguous. Interpreted narrowly, it might condemn only a fully integrated 
relationship between a lawyer and a nonlawyer. Interpreted broadly, it 
might condemn the contractual relationship as well. Second, if “integrated 
co-operation” condemns both, then the CCBE’s position is too little, too 
late. The contractual relationship is firmly established throughout Western 
Europe and in other parts of the world as well. The CCBE as much as 
admits this failure. At the end of the language quoted above it adds: “In 
those countries where such forms of co-operation are permitted, lawyer 
independence, client confidentiality and disciplinary supervision of 
conflicts-of-interests rules must be safeguarded.”198 
Despite the seeming clarity of the CCBE’s opposition to integrated co-
operation (whatever that term means), the organization has left itself some 
wiggle room. In a report summarizing a Multilateral Meeting on the ethics 
of lawyers sponsored by the Council of Europe in collaboration with the 
Czech Bar Association, the CCBE agreed to a number of propositions 
styled “Conclusions.”199 Included among them were that “[p]artnerships 
http://www.ccbe.org/Documents/En/mdpuk.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2002). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. The CCBE Position makes clear its disapproval of those countries that permit integrated 
co-operation, however: 
Where integrated co-operation is permitted, there is also often a body of rules intended to provide 
for the problems discussed, such as rules on internal partitioning of the relevant organisation 
(colloquially referred to as the use ‘Chinese Walls’). CCBE does not accept that, given 
circumstances and/or specific professional rules such as these, the likelihood of the actual 
occurrence of breaches of lawyer independence, of client confidentiality or of the respect for the 
avoidance of conflicts of interest will be appreciably lessened. The complexities alone that are 
necessarily attendant upon an organisation as under consideration here, and upon the application 
of rules of the type indicated, make it unlikely that the relevant problems can truly be adequately 
met. 
Id. 
 199. CCBE, CONCLUSIONS OF THE MULTILATERAL MEETING ORGANIZED BY THE COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE IN COLLABORATION WITH THE CZECH BAR ASSOCIATION, 1 J. CCBE-CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 6, 8 (2000), at www.ccbe.org/uk/uk.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2002). 
The Multilateral Meeting took place November third through fifth, 1999 just before the organization 
adopted the Position of CCBE on Integrated Forms of Co-Operation on November twelfth. While one 
can argue that the conclusions of the Multilateral Meeting were implicitly rejected on November 
twelfth, the CCBE Journal article makes no mention of any disagreement. It is likely that the CCBE 
delegates to the Multilateral Meeting recognized the handwriting on the wall (namely that contractual 
relationships between lawyers and nonlawyers were firmly established as acceptable vehicles for the 
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with members of other professions, such as architects, engineers and 
doctors, could be envisaged, according to the needs of the profession of 
lawyers” and that “the idea of an additional code of conduct for 
multidisciplinary partnerships should be explored.”200 In light of the steady 
growth in Europe of MDPs structured in the form of contractual 
relationships between lawyers and nonlawyers, the 1999 position is most 
likely not the CCBE’s last word on MDPs. The Conclusions suggest that 
CCBE’s position will evolve over time to accommodate changes in the 
marketplace for legal services.  
The position of the IBA and the UIA differs significantly from the 
CCBE’s. Perhaps in a nod to the reality of the marketplace, both 
organizations have chosen not to express a view on the merits of the MDP 
debate. Instead, each has promulgated a set of principles or standards to 
guide regulators in the event that a jurisdiction decides to permit MDPs. 
The subject matter of the principles or standards are, of course, the 
nettlesome core issues of the MDP debate: independence of professional 
judgment, avoidance of conflicts of interest, and protection of client 
communications. The IBA principles offer only the most general 
guidance.201 The UIA Standards are more particularized.202 Both sets of 
delivery of legal services) and were identifying new directions for the organization to pursue. 
 200. Id. 
 201. The principles adopted by the IBA that should govern if a jurisdiction chooses to permit 
MDPs are: 
(a) a requirement to clearly disclose to regulatory and disciplinary authorities and to the public the 
manner in which integrated co-operation with non lawyers is affected, and the interests 
represented in the organization concerned; 
(b) a requirement for submission of the entire organization in question, including its nonlawyers, 
to the regulatory and disciplinary authorities of the legal profession; 
c) a requirement for giving of clear notice to clients as to the limitations inherent in forms of 
integrated co-operation and the risk attaching thereto; 
(d) precise requirements on the avoidance of conflicting interests which exclude the possibility of 
combining auditing services with consulting services or legal representation; 
(e) precise rules on restriction of access to confidential information; 
(f) provisions setting out the minimum degree of ownership and/or voting control which lawyers 
must hold in MDPs and the maximum degree of ownership and/or voting control which 
nonlawyers may hold in MDPs. 
Resolution on Multi-disciplinary Practices adopted by the Council of the International Bar 
Association, Sept. 13, 1998. 
 202. UIA, Resolution on Multidisiplinary Practices, at http://uianet.org/english/ 
e_resolution_newdelhi1999.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2002). The IUA’s Resolution on Multidisciplinary 
Practices identifies six areas that must be addressed if a jurisdiction is to provide “minimum 
protections for clients”: “Standard 1: Professional Conduct”; “Standard 2: Independence”; “Standard 
3: Informing the Public”; “Standard 4: Advertising”; “Standard 5: Conflicts of Interest”; and “Standard 
6: Privilege”. Id. For a general description of why the UIA adopted the Resolution, see Delos N. 
Lutton, Remarks to the American Bar Association http://www.abanet.org/cpr/lutton.html (last visited 
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guidelines clearly lack the specificity and detail associated with lawyer 
codes of conduct in the United States.203 Their real significance lies in the 
IBA’s and UIA’s implicit recognition that it is possible to protect the core 
values of the legal profession if lawyers are permitted to work with 
nonlawyers in an MDP. By not lining up behind the CCBE’s hardline 
opposition to integrated co-operation, the two organizations have 
affirmatively acknowledged the legitimacy of MDPs as vehicles for the 
delivery of legal services in the new millennium. 
III. HOW THE STRUCTURE, CULTURE, AND ETHICS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE RAPID 
GROWTH OF MDPS  
Synergistic interactions among the structure, culture, and ethics of the 
legal professions in Western Europe have, over time, created a business 
and regulatory environment that hindered law firms’ ability to respond 
competitively when the Big Five initially exhibited an interest in offering 
legal services. If the law firms had paid more attention to changes in the 
marketplace and responded more quickly and imaginatively, the Big Five 
would have encountered meaningful competition, making their expansion 
more costly and less certain of success. Structure, culture, and ethics 
combined to hobble the expansion and evolution of law firms within and 
across jurisdictions.  
In the day-to-day activities of lawyers, the structure, culture, and ethics 
of a jurisdiction’s legal profession are inexorably intertwined. Each is a 
part of what Professor Merryman so ably described as “legal tradition.”204 
While separating their strands for analytical purposes can be an insightful 
exercise, it is also a dangerous one to the extent that it suggests the 
strands’ irrelation or isolation from one another. Subject to this caveat, 
Apr. 1, 2002). Mr. Lutton is the U.S. National Vice President of the IUA and a member of its 
Committee on MDPs. 
 203. I have explored the importance of understanding this distinction elsewhere. See Mary C. 
Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding the Differences in 
Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1117 (1999). 
 204. In a now classic definition, Professor Merryman described a “legal tradition” as 
a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of the law, about the role 
of law in the society and the polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal system, 
and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught. The legal 
tradition relates the legal system to the culture of which it is a partial expression. It puts the legal 
system into cultural perspective. 
JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS 
OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 2 (2d ed. 1985). 
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four features of the legal professions in Western Europe demand special 
attention: first, the perception of both clients and lawyers about the role of 
lawyers in business transactions; second, the divided character of the legal 
professions that exists in most civil law countries; third, the ethical and 
legal constraints that until very recently limited the size and geographic 
expansion of law firms; and fourth, the ethical prohibitions on advertising.  
In the United States, lawyers play a central role in structuring business 
transactions, both large and small. Clients and lawyers alike perceive that 
lawyers’ participation adds value to a deal.205 This perception is not shared 
in other parts of the world. “It is only in the U.S. that people have assumed 
that a transaction is necessarily a legal matter—it is a business deal.”206 
Reinforcing this difference is the fact that the “office lawyer” never 
shaped the foreign legal professions’ self-image as it has in the United 
States since the Civil War.207 That self-image received an additional boost 
in the 1970’s and the 1980’s, when the phenomenon of “celebrity” lawyers 
emerged in the legal and popular media.208 Business lawyers such as Joe 
Flom and Robert Joffe became the subject of profiles and gossip.209 In 
contrast, foreign business lawyers have eschewed publicity for themselves 
and their firms. The rules of lawyer conduct, such as those governing 
 205. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreward: Business Lawyers and Value 
Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1 (1995); Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: 
Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984). 
 206. Wade Lambert, Lawyers and Clients, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 17, 1995, at B8 (quoting Charles 
Kuyk, Partner at Price Waterhouse).  
 207. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 633-48 (2d ed. 1985). 
 208. The emergence of a magazine-style legal press with a national subscriber base was 
instrumental in promoting “super-star” lawyers in the United States. The American Lawyer was 
especially influential. Although no similar stand-alone publications exist in Western Europe, they do in 
the United Kingdom. They include Legal Business, a magazine whose editor is an alumna of the 
American Lawyer. Legal Business and the American Lawyer have begun to collaborate on projects 
such as the annual publication of The Global 50, an issue of the American Lawyer devoted to the 
globalization of the legal profession. See Aric Press, In-House at the American Lawyer, AM. LAW., 
Nov. 1998, at 9. One indication of the importance of cross-border practice is that within the space of 
only three years the Global 50 issue has become the Global 100 issue. Aric Press, Lessons from the 
Global 100, AM. LAW., Nov. 2001, at 89 [hereinafter Lessons from the Global 100].  
 Legal Business has added a second magazine, European Legal Business that is published bi-
monthly. That magazine has begun to view the legal profession in Western Europe through the same 
lens that the American Lawyer and Legal Business view the U.S. and U.K. legal professions. See, e.g., 
Nick Reader, Top Marks, EUR. LEGAL BUS., Apr. 2001, at 21. This article was the magazine’s cover 
story where it carried the headline, Germany’s Best-Kept Secrets REVEALED: Fees and Partner 
Profits at Germany’s Top 25 Law Firms. The publication of such an article would have been 
unimaginable as recently as ten years ago. It flies in the face of the traditional decorum associated with 
law firms in Western Europe. 
 209. E.g., John E. Morris, Joseph Flom (1923 - ): Takeover Artist, AM. LAW., Dec., 1999, at 61; 
John E. Morris, Twelve Corporate Lawyers Who Led the Pack in 1998, AM. LAW., Apr. 1999, at 44; 
Amy Singer, The Next Face of Cravath?, AM. LAW., May 1997, at 45. 
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advertising discussed below,210 have contributed to their reticence.  
The perception of the centrality of the lawyer’s role in business deals in 
the United States is also shaped by the purchasing agent function of the 
general counsel. The general counsel decides whether the deal should be 
handled internally by the in-house legal department or externally by an 
outside law firm. Regardless of the decision’s resolution, lawyers will be 
key players on the deal team. Many companies in Western Europe do not 
have in-house counsel or use nonlawyers to perform the functions of in-
house counsel.211 Management performs the purchasing agent function. If 
a company’s management does see any difference in the value of the 
advice rendered by lawyers and accountants (and frequently it does not), 
the deal team may well be lawyerless.212 To the extent that the company’s 
chief financial officer (CFO) influences the management’s decision, the 
decision is likely to favor the selection of an accounting firm, because the 
ties between a CFO and the company’s accounting firm are usually quite 
strong.213  
The divided character of the legal professions in Western Europe has 
also significantly contributed to the creation of legal and business 
environments in which the roles of lawyers and accountants overlap 
extensively. In a unitary legal system, such as the one in the United States, 
a single individual licensed to practice law can litigate a matter in court in 
the morning, negotiate a business deal in the afternoon, and draft a will in 
the evening. The structure of the legal professions outside the United 
States is very different. “While the common law legal professions have 
produced, at the most, three divisions of judge, advocate, and office 
lawyer (i.e., barrister and solicitor), the civil code system has produced a 
 210. See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text. 
 211. I have explored this topic at length elsewhere. See Daly, supra note 62.  
 212. See Larry Smith, New Adversaries: Big-6 Accounting Firms Encroach Foreign Legal Turf, 
COUNSEL, Mar. 6, 1995, at 5-6. As more U.S. and U.K. companies become global enterprises, 
exporting organizational and management structures along with products and services, general counsel 
will assume greater power and prestige in Western Europe. Foreign lawyers who have studied in U.S. 
law schools and/or worked in U.S. law firms and businesses will facilitate this change when they 
return to their home countries with a different vision of in-house lawyering. See Daly, supra note 62. 
 213. See Philip Hoult, Corporate Counsel: Key to MDP Success, THE LAW., Oct. 13, 1998, at 13 
(reporting the statement of a member of a law firm affiliated with PwC that “his firm had several times 
been instructed via a company’s finance director or board without the knowledge of the in-house 
counsel.”); Marcy Burstiner, The Goliaths, CAL. BUS. LAW., Nov. 24, 1997, at 13 (“Not only do the 
accounting firms audit the balance sheets of every large and mid-sized company in the United States, 
they are also the first place companies turn to when they are recruiting a chief financial officer . . . . I 
think [the chief financial officers] feel bound to the accounting firms to throw them some work”). 
Several witnesses before the Commission viewed the relationships between CFOs and the Big Five’s 
audit units as threatening the role of the general counsel. In the author’s opinion, this concern merits 
serious attention. See Daly, supra note 2, at 283-84.  
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plethora of types of lawyers—for example, notaries, magistrates, judges, 
advocates, civil servants, prosecutors—all as discrete categories.”214 
Accordingly, it is an “ethnocentric misnomer”215 mistake to speak of “a 
lawyer” in most civil law countries, because the functions associated with 
the practice of law, such as those described above, are divided among 
different legal professionals.  
Legal professionals are educated and/or trained separately.216 The 
members of each group generally identify only with one another. There is 
little or no cross-over identification with other groups or their members. 
Each group has its own professional organizations, disciplinary systems, 
codes of conduct, and formal and informal cultural understandings. 
Interoccupational mobility between the groups is limited.217 As Professor 
Abel has observed, “the several categories of law graduates–judges and 
prosecutors, civil servants, corporate employees, advocates, notaries and 
so on–do not see themselves as a single profession and even lack a 
common name.”218 This structural and professional isolation has a very 
practical impact on the growth of MDPs in Western Europe. To the extent 
that any particular group of legal professionals perceives its livelihood 
threatened by the expansion of professional services entities offering legal 
services, it generally cannot muster meaningful moral or political support 
from the other groups. This isolation makes it easier for the proponents of 
MDPs to accuse a group opposed to those entities’ expansion of turf 
protection and acting out of self-interest. There is, moreover, no single 
organization or group that can claim to be speaking as a representative of 
the entire legal profession219 in defense of the public interest.220 While 
 214. John Flood, The Cultures of Globalization: Professional Restructuring for the International 
Market, in PROFESSIONAL COMPETITION AND PROFESSIONAL POWER: LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS AND 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MARKETS 139, 146-47 (Yves Dezalay & David Sugarman eds., 1995); 
see also Olivier d’Ormesson, French Perspectives on the Duty of Loyalty: Comparisons with the 
American View, in RIGHTS, LIABILITY, AND ETHICS, supra note 33, at 29, 29 (in France the legal 
services provided by U.S. lawyers are delivered by eight different professions). See generally Abel, 
supra note 33, at 4 (describing the distinguishing aspects of the legal profession in the civil law 
world); MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 131 (2d ed. 1994). 
 215. Abel, supra note 33, at 4. 
 216. For a fuller description, see Daly, supra note 2, at 227-29. 
 217. Abel, supra note 33, at 8; Ehrard Blankenbug & Ulrike Schultz, German Advocates: A 
Highly Regulated Profession, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD, supra note 33, at 
124, 134. 
 218. Richard L. Abel, Revisioning Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: AN OVERVIEW 4 (Richard 
L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1995). 
 219. The explanation for their absence is straightforward. 
 In civil law countries professional associations have tended to play a less crucial role in 
defining the legal profession for two reasons. First, primary legal education occurred at the 
university rather than the practical, apprenticeship mechanism typical of the common law nations 
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“voluntary associations . . . are central to the professional project of 
private practitioners in the common law world,” they are “irrelevant to the 
majority of law graduates employed in the public or private sectors in the 
civil law world [and] differ significantly from the local, official, 
compulsory associations of civil law private practitioners.”221 
The most prominent legal professional in most civil law countries is 
one with “the right of audience,” whose role and functions closely 
resemble those of a trial lawyer in the United States or a barrister in the 
United Kingdom. These legal professionals have historically distanced 
themselves from counseling clients on business transactions, limiting their 
practices to court-related representations. As noted earlier, the “office 
until the twentieth century. Second, most members of the civilian legal professions have been 
judges, prosecutors, civil servants, and today in-house corporate counsel; private practitioners 
were in the minority. For public lawyers the state assumed the task of controlling entry, promoting 
status, guaranteeing security (civil service), and regulating conduct; lawyers did not have to 
associate together to accomplish these aims. By contrast, private attorneys have always dominated 
the common law legal profession. 
David S. Clark, Comparing the Work and Organization of Lawyers Worldwide: The Persistence of 
Legal Traditions, in LAWYERS’ PRACTICE AND IDEALS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW, supra note 13, at 9, 
134 (citations omitted). An additional reason for their lack of prominence is that “[p]rofessional 
associations developed late and tended to be local.” Abel, supra note 218, at 4.  
 220. The ABA presents itself as the voice of the entire profession. While the correctness of that 
description may be open to debate, the fact remains that the ABA is a powerful institution whose 
views are weighed (even if not always accepted) on important issues affecting the legal profession, the 
courts, and the civil and criminal systems of justice. One recent incident involving an attempt by the 
accounting profession to increase its members’ professional stature illustrates how the existence of a 
single institution capable of representing the entire profession in the interest of the public can be 
critical. Prior to 1998, federal law did not recognize an accountant-client privilege comparable to the 
attorney-client privilege. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984). On 
several occasions, the Big Five unsuccessfully lobbied Congress, seeking the enactment of a statute 
creating such a privilege. In 1997 and 1998, highly publicized testimony at Congressional hearings 
portrayed the IRS as an inflexible, arrogant agency that bullied low- and moderate-income taxpayers. 
Seizing upon that testimony, the Big Five once again lobbied Congress for the creation of an 
accountant-client privilege, this time phrasing their arguments in terms of consumer protection and 
equality. They argued that low- and moderate-income taxpayers could not afford to hire lawyers in tax 
disputes with the IRS, but that they could afford to hire accountants. Fundamental notions of equality 
demanded that these taxpayers be able to communicate confidentially with their accountants to the 
same extent as richer taxpayers with their lawyers.  
 The ABA vigorously opposed the creation of an accountant-client privilege. While it was unable 
to derail the legislation entirely, it did persuade Congress to cut back significantly on the scope of the 
privilege sought by the Big Five. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, THE NEW TAX PRACTITIONER-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE THAT PROTECTS TAX ADVICE FROM DISCLOSURE: WHAT CPAS, ENROLLED 
AGENTS, ENROLLED ACTUARIES, AND LAWYERS NEED TO KNOW (1998). If the United States, like the 
countries of Western Europe, had a divided legal profession, there would have been no single 
organization speaking on behalf of the entire bar. If the ABA’s protest had emanated from an 
organization representing, for example, only trial lawyers, the success of its opposition would have 
been less likely. 
 221. Abel, supra note 218, at 42. 
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lawyer” never shaped this profession’s self-image as it did in the United 
States.222 In large measure, the difference is attributable to the profession’s 
desire to maintain a prestigious status in society. That status rested on an 
identification with the landed aristocracy which, in turn, was accompanied 
by a disinterest in industrialization and potential clients who were 
accumulating wealth in the manufacturing sector of the economy.223 As the 
noted sociologist of the legal profession, Bryant Garth, has observed, there 
was a problem of supply and demand: 
One aspect of the supply problem was that lawyers in “the limit the 
supply” jurisdictions of the civil law world had made a virtue of 
their lack of connection to business, which was thought to 
compromise their independence. The demand problem was that 
businesses tended to rely on intermediaries other than lawyers—
bankers, family members, political leaders—to resolve their 
problems and disputes.224 
Further contributing to the impotency of the divided legal profession is 
the limited reach of UPL statutes. UPL statutes generally protect only the 
scope of practice of legal professionals who possess the right of audience. 
A license is generally not needed to offer business counseling that includes 
advice on the law no matter how extensive that advice may be. Drafting 
documents intended to alter legal relationships of a business nature is also 
allowed.225  
 222. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 223.  Mark J. Osiel, Lawyers as Monopolists, Aristocrats, and Entrepreneurs, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
2009, 2040-43 (1990). 
 224. Bryant Garth, Comparative Law and the Legal Profession: Notes Toward a Reorientation of 
Research, in LAWYERS’ PRACTICE AND IDEALS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW, supra note 13, at 227, 233. 
The U.K., France, and Germany are “limit the supply jurisdictions” in Garth’s lexicon, because they 
are defendant oriented. In contrast, the United States is a demand jurisdiction because the incentive 
structure of the law is plaintiff oriented. See id. at 231. Professor Mattei makes the interesting claim 
that “[a]s a result of the restraint on advertising, the typical professional agenda of lawyers in England, 
Germany, and France is focused on limiting supply. In America [where advertising is permitted], to 
the contrary, the most important activity seems to be stimulating demand.” Ugo Mattei, The Legal 
Profession as an Organization: Understanding Changes in the Common and Civil Law, in LAWYERS’ 
PRACTICE AND IDEALS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW, supra note 13, at 151, 179. 
 225. Of course, the drafter must be careful not to usurp functions reserved to the notary. See 
generally Luis Algar Calderón, The Legal Professions in Spain, in THE LEGAL PROFESSIONS IN THE 
NEW EUROPE, supra note 33, at 293, 305-06; DANOVI, supra note 33, at 237-38; Sanglade & Cohen, 
supra note 33, at 128. See generally Pedro A. Malavet, Counsel for the Situation: The Latin Notary, A 
Historical and Comparative Model, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389 (1996). See also 
Stewart Baker & Theodore Barassi, The International Notarial Practitioner, 24 ABA INT’L L. NEWS, 
Fall 1995, at 1. 
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As a consequence of this broad range of service providers (e.g., non-
lawyers, legal professionals with the right of audience, notaries, tax 
advisors, business lawyers, etc.),226 clients and the public in general are 
less receptive to the objections raised to MDPs. They simply do not see 
why advice from a legal professional in business matters should be 
protected by special monopoly rights. They find it even more difficult to 
see why a legal professional should be allowed to offer advice in a law 
firm setting but not in an MDP setting.  
Ethical and legal constraints also handcuffed the law firms in Western 
Europe, severely limiting their ability to compete effectively with MDPs. 
The requirements of localization, singular admission, residency, and law 
office were particularly powerful inhibitors. The localization and singular 
admission requirements restricted a lawyer’s admission to one judicial 
district and to a court of either first instance or appeals, respectively. The 
residency requirement confined a lawyer’s practice to the judicial district 
of admission, and the law office requirement prevented a lawyer from 
offering legal services from any office other than one physically located in 
the judicial district of admission.227 While judicial intervention has largely 
invalidated these requirements,228 they had the practical effect of limiting 
law firm growth during the critical years in which the Big Five were 
rapidly expanding their capability to offer legal services. In addition, in 
some countries, such as Germany, a ban on branch offices and national 
partnerships complimented these restrictive requirements.229 
The ethical rules banning lawyer advertising also considerably 
weakened any prospect that law firms could effectively compete with the 
 226. The Netherlands offers a crisp snapshot of this competitive mix. 
Since there is no monopoly for attorneys providing legal advice, some legal services are provided 
by law graduates and half-trained persons not admitted to the bar. Social advocacy attorneys, for 
instance, compete with legal aid bureaus (with three hundred salaried law graduates) and trade 
unions that hire law graduates as labor lawyers. General attorneys compete with insurance 
companies for legal costs and automobile clubs that hire law graduates for tort advice. Business 
clients often turn to tax advisors and accountants rather than to attorneys. And old age pensioners 
might take their legal problems to social workers. 
Clark, supra note 219, at 34 (citing ERHARD BLANKENBURG & FREEK BRUINSMA, DUTCH LEGAL 
CULTURE 31-34, 36-38 (2d ed. 1994)). For a description of a similar competitive mix in Spain, see id. 
at 112 (citing JULIAN LONBAY ET AL., TRAINING LAWYERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 112-13 
(1990)). 
 227. See Andreas G. Junius, The German System, in RIGHTS, LIABILITY, AND ETHICS, supra note 
33, at 59, 59-60; Ehard Blankenburg & Ulrike Schultz, German Advocates: A Highly Regulated 
Profession, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD, supra note 33, at 124, 139. 
 228. The European Court of Justice and the German Constitutional Court have aggressively 
invalidated these types of restrictions. See Daly, supra note 2, at 230 nn.39-40. 
 229. Junius, supra note 227, at 60. 
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Big Five.230 In many countries,231 business cards and dignified entries in a 
telephone directory were the only form of permitted advertising.232 The 
ban reflected a guild mentality and was deeply rooted in bar’s insistence 
that the practice of law was a profession not a trade or business.233 The 
rules enormously impeded the recruitment of new clients and 
announcements of new competencies. Even if advertising had been 
permitted, the Big Five would still have possessed other powerful, 
associated advantages over law firms. To begin with, the operating income 
available to them for advertising certainly far exceeded that available to 
law firms, either individually or collectively. It was more than a question 
of money, however. The Big Five were experienced media purchasers and 
had a vast reservoir of country-and-industry specific knowledge upon 
which they could draw to create and place effective advertisements. The 
law firms in Western Europe had no comparable resources.  
 230. See Leny E. De Groot-Van Leeuwen, Polishing the Bar: The Legal Ethics Code and 
Disciplinary System of the Netherlands, and a Comparison with the United States, 4 INT’L J. LEGAL 
PROF. 9, 12 (1997); Ulkrike Schultz, Legal Ethics in Germany, 4 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 55, 63 (1997); 
Lauren Dobrowalski, Comment, Maintaining the Dignity of the Profession: An International 
Perspective on Legal Advertising and Solicitation, 12 DICK. J. INT’L L. 367 (1994). See also Stefano 
Agostini, Advertising and Solicitation: A Comparative Analysis of Why Italian and American Lawyers 
Approach Their Profession Differently, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 329, 341 (1996); Carsten 
Eggers, Germany, in LAW WITHOUT FRONTIERS, supra note 34, at 81, 85; Louise L. Hill, Lawyer 
Publicity in the European Union: Bans Are Removed but Barriers Remain, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. 
& ECON. 381 (1995); Albert Tanghe, Publish and Be Damned—Local Bar Publicity Restrictions, 1 
LAW. IN EUR. 3 (1990); Austria Bar Dispute, INT’L FIN. L. REV., June 1994, at 3; Robert Lever, 
American Attorneys in Paris, NAT’L L.J., June 22, 1987, at 42; Barbara Galli, Italian Firms Face 
Foreign Invasion, INT’L FIN. L. REV., May 1998, at 33; Sarah Marks, Finnish Lawyers Face Up to 
Competition, INT’L FIN. L. REV., May 1995, at 20, 21; Samantha Wigham, Foreign Influence Pushes 
German Lawyers into New Mergers, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 1997, at 41, 42-43. 
 231. While all the countries in Western Europe disapprove of advertising, there are nuances in 
their disapproval.  
The South European (Italy, Greece, Austria) and in some ways the German and Belgium bars are 
against publicity, the Italians very strongly. The North Europeans (Britons, Scandinavians, Dutch) 
and tentatively the new bars of Eastern Europe, permit advertising but advise against soliciting and 
touting. Dignity is their main concern. In between stand Spain, Portugal, and France. 
Henri Ader, Differences and Common Elements in Legal Ethics in France and the United States, in 
LAWYER’S PRACTICE & IDEALS, supra note 13, at 351, 359. 
 232. Similar bars were in place across the United States until the Supreme Court extended the 
protection of the First Amendment to the commercial speech of lawyers and law firms. E.g., Shapero 
v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1986); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 
637 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206-07 (1982); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 
384 (1977).  
 233. Mattei, supra note 224, at 167. Mattei has suggested that 
The prohibition of advertising is the result of the fiction in the inquisitorial mentality that a judge 
will find a litigant who is right to be so; it is also founded on the limited negotiability of services 
of the defense, seen from the perspective of the interests of justice and not of the client. 
Id. at 167 n.46. 
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Finally, there is the fundamental question of what image the law firms 
would have tried to project if the obstacles of the ethical bar and limited 
financial resources were overcome. Both in Western Europe and the 
United States, the Big Five implemented carefully planned and 
comprehensive strategies designed to shift the public’s perception of the 
accounting firms from “bean counters” to “problem solvers.”234 Thus, they 
no longer described themselves as accounting firms but rather as 
professional services firms. They emphasized the wide range of business 
activities upon which they were competent to advise, the multidisciplinary 
skills that they could bring to bear on a problem, and their ability to 
service a client in multiple jurisdictions simultaneously. A creative 
dynamism infused the image they were projecting. U.S. lawyers have also 
championed their problem solving skills as well,235 and U.S. law schools 
continue to wrestle with how to impart those skills to their students.236 
Instrumentalism is highly valued by both clients and lawyers.237  
The problem-solver image fits uncomfortably with the self-conception 
of many business lawyers in Western Europe. Their self-conception is 
more technocratic, less dynamic. They see themselves as performing a 
“fairly narrow range of functions,”238 and their role as advising a client on 
what the law permits it to do or not do. That role leaves little room for 
 234. One observer has almost perfectly captured the shift. 
An American will be startled to see brochures in Andersen’s London office lobby with titles such 
as “Corporate Financial Flagship Deals” and “Leverage Transactions.” The description of one $67 
million deal shows just how far Andersen has moved away from bean counting: It boasts that 
Andersen’s role included “managing the buyout process . . . advising management on . . .[its] 
business plan . . . [and] raising the equity, debt, and mezzanine financing.” 
Morris, supra note 37, at 50. 
 235. The problem solver image is one the legal and popular press particularly associates with 
celebrity business lawyers. See supra note 209. 
 236. Paul Brest & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Lawyers as Problem Solvers, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 811 
(1999); Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching Professional Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REV. 527 
(1994). See also Janeen Kerper, Creative Problem Solving vs. The Case Method: A Marvelous 
Adventure in Which Winnie-the-Pooh Meets Mrs. Palsgraf, 34 CAL. W.L. REV. 351 (1998); Roy T. 
Stuckey, Education for the Practice of Law: The Times They Are A-Changin’, 75 NEB. L. REV. 648 
(1996). See generally PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION 
MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT (forthcoming). See also Mary C. Daly, What the MDP 
Debate Can Teach Us About Law Practice in the New Millennium and the Need for Curricular 
Reform, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 521 (2000). 
 237. As the noted comparative law scholar, David S. Clark, has observed: “American lawyers 
demonstrate an entrepreneurial zeal associated with an instrumentalist conception of law as a tool for 
implementing or resisting social change. They have developed new organizational forms and other 
innovations as part of an adoptive, expansionist approach to law practice.” Clark, supra note 219, at 20 
n.30 (citing Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, New Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of 
the Legal Profession, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 6-7 (Robert L. Nelson et al., eds., 1992)). 
 238. Abel, supra note 33, at 22. 
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creatively imagining how to use the law instrumentally to further a client’s 
fundamental business goals.239  
IV. THE BIG FIVE’S ECONOMIC THREAT TO TRADITIONAL LAW FIRM 
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND WESTERN EUROPE PRIOR TO 
ANDERSEN’S COLLAPSE 
A. Introduction 
Andersen’s collapse and the consequent disintegration of Andersen 
Legal, its foreign law firm network, make it difficult to assess precisely 
the economic threat that the Final Four’s legal networks currently pose. 
Three observations can be made without qualification, however: first, that 
the demand for cross-border legal services remains strong and will 
continue to grow;240 second, that before Andersen’s collapse, the legal 
networks affiliated with the Big Five were on the verge of becoming 
formidable competitors in certain sectors of the marketplace for cross-
border legal services;241 and third, that the Final Four will generously 
support their affiliated law firm networks to advance the long-term goal of 
enabling the member firms to increase their marketplace share at the 
expense of traditional law firms.242 
The market for lawyers’ services in the global economy is growing by 
leaps and bounds. The top one hundred global firms grossed $36 billion in 
legal fees in 2000.243 That translated into a twenty-seven percent increase 
in per equity partner profits.244 It also represented an increase of sixty-one 
percent in three years for the top fifty law firms from $15 billion to $24.5 
billion and a sixteen percent increase in revenue per lawyer over two 
 239. This observation is reflected, for example, in the comment of the international in-house 
counsel for France Telecom who said in comparing French firms to their “anglo-saxon counterparts” 
that the French firms “do have a tendency to be less pragmatic and not present in the negotiation 
process.” Paris Lawyers Reap Rewards as French Learn to Loosen Up, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 2001, 
at 25, 26. A British partner in the Paris branch of a prominent U.K. firm similarly observed, “[t]he 
French have a tendency to compartmentalize everything so that if it cannot be compartmentalized you 
can’t really do it.” Id. at 29. The defenders of the traditional conception of the role of a lawyer are not 
without a rejoinder. In commenting upon the “battle of professional cultures,” one Dutch lawyer pitted 
“[t]he old-fashioned brain surgeon type of lawyer who is quite autonomous, against the plumber type 
of Anglo-Saxon practice with the emphasis on standard quality and speed of transaction, rather than 
the intellectual challenge.” Richard Tyler, Time to Follow the U.K. Flow?, THE LAW., Oct. 13, 1998, 
at 27. 
 240. See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text. 
 241. See e.g., supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. 
 242. See infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text. 
 243. Lessons from the Global 100, supra note 208, at 89. 
 244. Id. 
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years.245 The nature of cross-border legal services is also expanding. While 
transactional work constitutes the bulk of the practice, multinational 
litigation, principally in the form of arbitration, is becoming an 
increasingly important source of revenue.246 
In contrast, the market for traditional auditing and accounting services 
has been shrinking.247 Diminished revenue and profits forced the Big Five 
and their predecessors to identify new competencies to offer existing and 
new clients. Recognizing that their most valuable asset was an in-depth 
knowledge of their clients’ businesses and related industries, the Big Five 
focused their considerable skills on developing consulting practices. Their 
game plan was to help clients do other things such as, for example, plan 
their corporate strategies and build and manage their information-
technology systems. They decided to add legal services to these other 
competencies because of its potential to generate significant revenue.248 
B. The Competitive Advantages of the Big Five’s Legal Networks 
The reasons why the Big Five’s legal networks posed an economic 
threat to traditional law firm practice in the United Kingdom and Western 
Europe are not difficult to grasp. Each network possessed at least twelve 
competitive advantages because of its affiliation with a Big Five firm: an 
institutional client base, cross-marketing opportunities, size, leverage, 
availability of capital, brand name recognition, institutional advertising, 
sophisticated marketing, cutting edge technology, substantial research and 
development, and international capabilities.249 While these advantages had 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. See Daly, supra note 2, at 261-62. 
 248. Jeffrey E. Garten, Ethics Be Damned, Let’s Merge, BUS. WK., Aug. 30, 1999, at 26 (quoting 
the Dean of the Yale School of Management). 
 249. See WARD BOWER, MULTIDISCIPLINARY PARTNERSHIPS IN THE FUTURE IN GLOBAL LAW 
PRACTICE 155, 158-60 (J. Ross Harper ed. 1997); Gary R. Garrett & Ward Bower, A Competitive 
Analysis of the Complex Litigation Services Market: Implications for Larger Law Firms (1995) (on 
file with the author). In the same vein, a U.K. partner at Arthur Andersen in response to the question 
“what are [the Big Five’s] particular strengths” answered: 
Their size, their financial resources and the human resources that they can devote to a transaction 
necessarily make them formidable. Their regular contact with the financial management and 
probably the general management of their clients give visibility as a natural provider of services. 
Perhaps most significant in the future will be their networks. These are networks of professionals, 
many of whom have worked together throughout their careers spread through offices in many 
countries. It is not so much that they can offer a “one stop shop” as they should be able to co-
ordinate their advice so as to provide appropriate answers to questions posed to them. 
David Dabyshire, Speech, How Do You Deal with Accounting Firms as Providers of Legal Services?, 
Mar. 7, 1990, at 3, in Seminar on Internationalization of Legal Practice: U.S. and European 
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the potential to make them the formidable competitors of law firms in the 
United States, their strength was far greater in Western Europe because of 
the historically small size of law firms, the ethical prohibitions on 
advertising, and lawyers’ self-conception of their role in advising 
clients.250 
The Big Five’s institutional client-base was clearly an advantage that 
law firms in Western Europe did not share. Because of regulatory 
requirements and marketplace demands, the Big Five performed audit 
services for most large and medium size companies. There were, of 
course, no “Big Five” law firms that could make a similar boast about 
their client list. The Big Five firms, moreover, had constant contact with 
the companies’ executive decision-makers.251 In contrast, a law firm’s 
client contacts are almost certain to be with and through the general 
counsel’s office and episodic rather than constant. The Big Five’s in-depth 
knowledge of the companies and their industries were persuasive reasons 
to hire the Big Five’s consulting groups, including affiliated law firms.252 
The traditional ties between CFOs and their auditors encouraged such 
engagements.253 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Big Five were not 
shy about using their working relationship with CFOs to gain “back door” 
entry into the legal services market.254 
The Big Five not only had a very sizable existing client-base ready to 
be tapped by their affiliated legal networks, but they also had the 
marketing and financial wherewithal needed to recruit new clients. The 
amount of money that the Big Five devoted to advertising was remarkable. 
Their total advertising budget for 2001 was approximately $200 million.255 
Perspectives and Opportunities Sponsored by Prentice Hall Law & Business in Conjunction With the 
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (University of London) (on file with the author). As a practical 
matter, the Big Five’s greatest threat may be their ability to provide cross-subsidies for legal services, 
leading to predatory pricing and unfair competition with law firms. Id. at 3.  
 Some management consultants believe that these advantages are not insurmountable and have 
suggested practical steps that law firms can implement to compete more effectively with MDPs that 
offer law-related services. See Charles M. Maddock, Me in an MDP? Preparing Your Firm for the 
Culture Shock, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 13, 2001, at 5. 
 250. See supra notes 227-39 and accompanying text. 
 251. Maddock, supra note 249. 
 252. Some commentators believe that the industry-team model used by the Big Five is more 
appealing to corporate managers than the practice-group model used by law firms. See, e.g., id. 
 253. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 254. See William Hannay, MDP=TEOTWAWKI . . . or Maybe Not, INT’L LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 
1998, at 23. Summary of the Testimony of M. Elizabeth Wall http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ 
wall1198.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2002). 
 255. Lee Berton, Big Five Up the Ante, ACCT. TODAY, Nov. 5, 2001, at 6. Precise dollar figures 
on lawyer advertising in the United States are difficult to compile. Furthermore, the figures are 
essentially meaningless unless they also identify the media placement. For example, lawyers spent 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss2/5
p589 Daly book pages.doc12/19/2002   4:41 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE OF MDPS 637 
 
 
 
 
 
Precisely how much of this money was earmarked for the promotion of 
their affiliated legal networks is difficult to ascertain. The sums reported in 
connection with their consulting arms suggest, however, that traditional 
law firms were on the precipice of confronting an unsurmountable 
competitive disadvantage.256 That disadvantage was not simply a question 
of money or the Big Five’s willingness to spend it. They could contain the 
costs associated with advertising and judge the merits of proposed media 
campaigns more efficiently than law firms because each Big Five firm had 
readily available, in-house expertise. Just as the Big Five counseled their 
clients on the clients’ corporate image, identified new markets for them, 
and shaped media campaigns to reach the clients’ targeted audience, they 
could perform those functions for the firms’ affiliated legal networks. 
Each Big Five firm, moreover, assiduously sought to create an individual 
“brand” reputation. Those brands collectively created a Big Five “brand” 
in the image of the problem-solver.257 This branding directly benefited the 
members of their affiliated legal networks and placed traditional law firms 
at a distinct disadvantage.  
The ability of the Big Five to raise capital has always been one of their 
particular strengths. In Western Europe, as in the United States,258 the 
approximately $809 million in 2000 to advertise in the yellow pages. YELLOW PAGES PUBLISHERS 
ASS’N, YELLOW PAGES: FACTS AND MEDIA GUIDE 2001 (2001) (on file with the author). While the 
legal profession’s total spending significantly surpasses the Big Five’s in dollar amounts, 
advertisements in the yellow pages are hardly comparable to the sophisticated marketing campaigns of 
the Big Five. Law firms have been notoriously unsuccessful in creating brand names. See, e.g., Jenna 
Greene, It’s Worked for Soda and Tennis Shoes. But Can the Latest Marketing Fad Aid Law Firms, 
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, at 1; Mark T. Greene, If I Only Had a Brand—No Matter How Much 
Money Law Firms Spend on Branding, They Don’t Have Brand Names and Won’t Be Getting Them 
Soon, AM. LAW., Oct. 2001, at 59, available at  WL 10/2001 Am. Law. 59. Crystal Nix Hines, A Legal 
Eagle (His Ad Claims), N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at C1. 
 256. Accenture, formerly part of Andersen, spent almost $45 million in the first quarter of its 
existence in 2001 to publicize its initial public offering. Berton, supra note 255. The total cost of its 
campaign is estimated to be $145 million. Mercedes Cardona & Hillary Chura, Pricewaterhouse Hires 
DiMassimo, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 19, 2001, at 32. PwC has committed $20 million to developing a 
brand and an integrated promotional campaign for its Financial Advisory Services group, if it 
ultimately decides to spin the group off from PwC. Id. In 2000, E&Y sold its consulting business to 
Cap Gemini. The new firm, Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, allocated $30 million to a global campaign to 
foster name recognition. Sarah Ellison & Kevin Delaney, Cap Gemini Will Use Ads to Boost Profile, 
Morale, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2000, at B12. 
 257. See supra note 234-35 and accompanying text. 
 258. The bar on sharing fees with a nonlawyer has the practical effect of prohibiting passive 
investment. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 5.4(a) (2000). The popular legal press has 
raised the possibility of public ownership of law firms. See, e.g., Susan Beck, The Case for Going 
Public: Taking a Law Firm Through an IPO Would Require Enormous Cultural Change. That’s a 
Good Thing, AM. LAW., July 1999, at 63; Steven Brill, Psst-Wanna Buy a Hot Stock, AM. LAW., Nov. 
1987, at 3. See also Steven Brill, War of the Law Firm, BUS. WK., Jan. 26, 1987, at 42. Academic 
attention to this possibility has only just begun. See Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p589 Daly book pages.doc12/19/2002   4:41 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
638 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:589 
 
 
 
 
 
ethics rules prohibit passive investment in law firms.259 Many MDP 
oponents have claimed that the capital resources available to the Big Five 
enabled the accounting firms to subsidize their affiliated law firms, 
becoming in effect passive investors. These subsidies allegedly took the 
form of below-the-market charges for rent, technology, and staffing. It is 
impossible to verify these claims because the Big Five firms and the 
members of their legal networks have refused to make the terms of the 
contracts public. 
C. The Underlying Strategic Plan 
The Big Five’s strategy for becoming players in the legal service 
market consisted of two-related moves. First, they built a network of 
affiliated law firms on a country-by-country basis. They endeavored to 
integrate the firms’ operations and management with their own to the 
maximum extent possible, while taking great care not to create a single 
multi-jurisdictional law firm or a fully integrated MDP. They undertook a 
meticulous study of the marketplaces in which the affiliated law firms 
offered services for the purpose of identifying potential clients. Middle-
tier companies were their primary targets.260 Judging by the Big Five’s 
reported revenues, they were quite successful in obtaining engagements 
from them.261 
Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1 
(1998). 
 259. Legislation is pending in New South Wales, Australia, that will allow law firms to 
incorporate, share profits with nonlawyers, and raise capital through passive investment. Shares in 
these law firms will float on the Australian Stock Exchange. See Legal Profession Amendment 
(National Competition Policy Review Bill), at http://www.lawsociety.com.au/pageasp?partid=470 (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2002); Steven Mark, Harmonization or Homogination? The Globalization of Law and 
Legal Ethics—An Austrialian Viewpoint, 34 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 1173 (2001). Shaw Should Watch the 
Society He Keeps, ABIX, Sept. 3, 1999, 1999 WL 26582433; Andrew Burrell, Shackles Removed for 
Law Firms, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Sept. 3, 1999, at 1, 1999 WL 19338405. Similar legislation has been 
proposed in France, but the Parliament has not acted. See infra notes 121-30. 
 260. See Geanne Rosenberg, Lawyers at the Big Five: Attorneys Employed Match Largest Law 
Firms, N.Y.L.J., May 23, 2000, at 5. The chief operating officer of Baker & McKenzie has observed: 
“‘I’m not saying the days of the big law firm are gone,’ . . . but when it comes to relying on streams of 
revenue from middle-market work, ‘those days are numbered.’” Id.; Arian Campo-Flores, King Arthur, 
AM. LAW., Jan. 2000, at 17 (speculating that only segment of the market Anderson is likely to 
dominate in the U.K. is “commercial lending and other types of second-tier work.”); Sean Farrell, 
Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Five?, AM. LAW., July 2000, at 65 (commenting that the Big Five “may 
have to accept their limitations and be content to offer solid midlevel corporate, employment, and tax 
advice internationally—they are in a position to dominate this work globally.”); Margaret A. Jacobs, 
Accounting Firms Covet Forbidden Fruit, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2000, at B1 (describing most of the 
Big Five’s European legal clients as “still small and medium-size companies”). 
 261. See, e.g., infra notes 272-74 and accompanying text. 
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Second, they strengthened their own law-related competencies, 
especially in the area of tax advising. The sheer number of lawyers they 
hired in recent years is impressive.262 Even more impressive, however, is 
the quality of some of the hires. An essential part of their recruitment 
strategy was to persuade prominent tax partners in elite law firms and 
senior government tax lawyers to join their staffs.263 At the time of 
Andersen’s collapse, they were also beginning a campaign to hire star-
quality lawyers in fields other than tax, such as mergers and acquisitions 
and business counseling.264  
 262. While figures for the Big Five’s hiring in the United Kingdom and Western European 
countries are not readily available, anecdotal reports suggest that it is similar to the pattern in the 
United States. 
Ernst & Young now has 800 tax attorneys on its U.S. staff, double the 400 it had several years 
ago. Price Waterhouse has around 500 tax lawyers in the U.S., up from about 250 three years ago. 
Arthur Andersen has 1,000 tax attorneys, 20% more than it had in 1994. 
Elizabeth MacDonald, Lawyers Protest Accounting Firms’ Hiring, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 1997, at B8. 
Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand merged at a later date, forming PwC. 
 263. They have implemented this strategy both in the United States and abroad. Compare Bruce 
Balestier, Under One Roof: ABA Faces Arrival of Lawyer-Accountant Pairings, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 19, 
1998, at 5 (referring to a “high profile coup” by an accounting firm in hiring a noted tax partner); Tom 
Herman, Tax Report: A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax Developments, WALL 
ST. J., June 18, 1997, at A1 (reporting the departure of a well-known Treasury attorney to an 
accounting firm); Jeffrey L. Jacobs, Multidisciplinary Recruiting War . . . The Tax Brain Drain to 
Accounting Firms Intensifies, 17 OF COUNSEL 7 (1998) (same); MacDonald, supra note 262 
(recounting the Big Five’s hiring of “legal eagles”); John E. Morris, The Tax Man Cometh, AM. LAW., 
Dec. 1998, at 16 (describing “an exodus” of prominent tax lawyers from law firms to the Big Five) 
with John E. Morris, Arthur Adds On, AM. LAW., Feb. 2000, at 21 (reporting the hiring of a leading 
partner at Clifford Chance Rogers & Wells); Clare Hepburn, End of the Line for Cosy Danish Closed 
Shop, INT’L FIN. L. REV., July, 1997, at 45, 45 (describing Arthur Andersen’s hiring of two Danish 
lawyers); Samantha Wigham, Norwegian Firms Await Inevitable Invasion, INT’L FIN. L. REV., July 
1997, at 35, 37 (describing Arthur Andersen’s hiring of Norwegian lawyers). They have also 
implemented this strategy in Canada. See Jim Middlemiss, Multidisciplinary Partnerships: The 
Writing on the Wall, NATIONAL, June-July 1997, at 21-22 (describing the raiding of prominent 
Canadian law firms by the Big Five); One Stop Shopping to the Nth Degree . . . Toronto the Latest 
Tell-Tale Sign of Big-6 Legal Ambitions, OF COUNSEL, July 7, 1997, at 2-5 (same). 
 264. See, e.g., supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (describing the ambitions of McKee 
Nelson); S. F., Full of Sound and Fury, AM. LAW., July 2000, at 69 (reporting the hiring of a 
prominent U.S. lawyer by Klegal, KPMG’s legal network, and a prominent U.K. solicitor by Andersen 
Legal); Campo-Flores, supra note 260 (reporting that Andersen Legal has been hiring “high caliber . . . 
lawyers with big books of business”); In Brief, EUR. LEGAL BUS., May/June 2001, at 7 (reporting 
Andersen Legal’s hiring of a prominent German lawyer). As one sharp-witted commentator observed 
the Big Five have “financial muscle that dwarfs even the largest law firms. When the accountants 
decide to go shopping for U.S. legal talent, they will come bearing Steinbrenner-sized gifts.” Lessons 
from the Global 100, supra note 208. 
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D. Measuring the Success of the Big Five’s Strategic Plan 
The Big Five were anything but shy about their ambitions. Indeed, 
many of their public pronouncements seem intended to intimidate law firm 
competitors as much as to attract new clients. Landwell, PwC’s affiliate, 
for example, publicly proclaimed its goal of being the fifth largest law 
firm in the world by the year 2004.265 To meet that goal, it would have to 
employ three thousand lawyers and generate one billion dollars in 
revenue.266 Landwell’s stated mission, moreover, was to be “a top-five 
global law firm by reputation as well as size.”267 Andersen Legal warned 
that it was aggressively “wooing higher-end work.”268  
Measuring the success of the Big Five’s strategic plan is a complicated 
undertaking because the only data available comes from articles in the 
popular and legal press. The way that data is reported is not consistent 
from month to month or year to year, even within a single publication.269 
A few observations can be safely made, however.  
Employment figures strongly suggest that the Big Five’s legal 
networks and internal units offering tax and law-related services were 
competing successfully with traditional law firms for certain categories of 
work. Before its disintegration, Andersen  
had on staff about 2,400 lawyers worldwide in affiliated law firms. 
This is five times as many lawyers as it had in 1994. In addition, in 
1998 Andersen had about 1,000 tax attorneys in the United States, 
20% more than in 1994. Price Waterhouse, prior to its merger with 
Coopers & Lybrand, exhibited similar growth in the number of 
lawyers working there. In 1998, it had on staff 3,000 lawyers 
worldwide, about 30% more than in 1995. In the United States, in 
1998, Price Waterhouse had about 500 tax lawyers, up from about 
 265. Rosenberg, supra note 260. 
 266. Jim Kelly & Robert Rice, PwC Plans to Build $1B Global Law Firm Network: Five-Year 
Target To Be Among the World’s Largest Legal Practices, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 1997, at 24; 
Rosenberg, supra note 260, at 5. PwC and its predecessors have been particularly vocal. See, e.g., 
Chris Klein, Gold Rush, Thin Stakes: U.S. Branches Face Fierce Competition from U.K. Solicitors, 
Accountants, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 12, 1996, at A1, A18 (quoting the head of Price Waterhouse’s 
European affiliates: “Right now we’re not a threat [to law firms], but the avowed intent is different.”); 
David Rubenstein, Accounting Firm Legal Practices Expand Rapidly. How the Big Six Firms Are 
Practicing Law in Europe: Europe First, Then the World?, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 1997, at 1 
(reporting that the Chairman of Coopers & Lybrand European Legal Services expected it would be 
among the largest law firms in the world by the end of the millennium.). 
 267. Rosenberg, supra note 260; S. F., supra note 264. 
 268. Lessons from the Global 100, supra note 208, at 89; see also Jacobs, supra note 260. 
 269. See infra note 276. 
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250 three years before. The number of lawyers working at Ernst & 
Young outside the United States was similarly large—more than 
1,170 lawyer in over 40 countries. Within the U.S., in 1998, about 
800 lawyers worked at Ernst & Young, about double the number 
that had worked there a few years earlier. In Europe, Ernst & Young 
had on staff about 600 lawyers in 1997. In 1998, Deloitte & Touche 
had on staff approximately 2,200 lawyers worldwide. KPMG 
indicated that in 1997 it had 1,125 employees who spend more than 
50% of their time providing legal services.270 
There is more than a little irony in the fact that Andersen Legal appears 
to have been the most successful of the Big Five’s legal networks. It 
ranked ninth in a list of the most profitable global law firms in 2000, tying 
with Sherman & Sterling.271 The two firms reported $590 million in 
revenue.272 Between 1998 and 1999, Andersen Legal’s revenue increased 
thirty percent.273 When measured by the number of attorneys it employed, 
Andersen Legal placed second with 2,880 lawyers. Baker & McKenzie 
beat it out for first place—but only by 43 lawyers. Andersen Legal took 
 270. CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, supra note 51, at 16 (footnotes omitted). See also Rosenberg, 
supra note 260, at 5 (observing “If you add up all the lawyers at the Big Five accounting firms and 
their affiliates, the total dwarfs the number of attorneys at the five largest law firms in the world.”). 
According to a 1998 National Law Journal survey, Arthur Andersen’s 1,500 lawyers would have 
made it the second largest law firm in the world, if MDP barriers were not in place. See Annual Survey 
of the Nation’s Largest Law Firms, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 16, 1998, at C5. See also Hannay, supra note 
254, at 1. 
 271. Lessons from the Global 100, supra note 208, at 89. 
 272. Id. Interpreting Andersen Legal’s revenue is particularly difficult because the measurements 
of comparison vary from publication to publication and, are even inconsistent with a single publication 
on occasion. According to one article, the number of Andersen Legal’s lawyers/fee-earners in 2001 
was 2,880, while Sherman & Sterling’s was 887. Id. at 123. Andersen Legal’s ranking based on 
revenue per lawyer was ninety-nine while Sherman & Sterling’s ranking based on average profits per 
equity partner was eleventh. In describing Andersen Legal’s financial year that ended August 31, 
2000, another publication estimated that “with an average of 418 partners in the network for the last 
financial year Andersen Legal racks up fees-per-partner of $1.26 m.” Andersen Legal fee income 
exceeds $500m, EUR. LEGAL BUS., Nov./Dec. 2000, at 9.  
 It is not clear, moreover, exactly what categories of lawyers/fee earners the statistics capture. In 
the very first Global 50 issue of the American Lawyer, the magazine indicated that the personnel 
figures for the accounting firms “include all lawyers in affiliated law firms and business lawyers in 
other divisions, but not lawyers practicing tax law exclusively with the firms’ accounting or tax 
divisions.” John E. Morris, The Global 50, AM. LAW., Nov. 1998, at 47. No mention is made of the 
accounting firms in 1999 or 2000 issues. The 2001 issue contains the general statement “[l]awyer 
numbers . . . reflect only those within a single partnership and do not include affiliations, networks, or 
those in separate partnerships, even if they operate under a single name. Methodology: The Global 
100, AM. LAW., Nov. 2001, at 118. Since Andersen Legal does not purport to be a single partnership, 
the statement’s accuracy open to question. 
 273. Campo-Flores, supra note 260. The rate was more than double that of the average Am Law 
100 firm. Id. 
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first place and Baker & McKenzie second place, however, when measured 
by the number of countries in which they maintained offices (36 v. 31).274  
V. PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS ON HOW ANDERSEN’S COLLAPSE WILL 
AFFECT THE FINAL FOUR’S EFFORTS TO BECOME PLAYERS IN THE 
MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES 
When it became clear that Andersen would not survive, the Final Four 
and second-tier accounting and consulting firms hired Andersen’s U.S. 
partners and staff on a piecemeal basis.275 The firms exercised caution 
because they feared successor liability under U.S. bankruptcy laws. 
Andersen’s foreign accounting offices generally negotiated with the Final 
Four independently of one another on a country-by-country basis.276 
Successor liability was less of a concern for the Final Four outside the 
United States because of the structure of Andersen Worldwide SC, the 
umbrella organization that linked Andersen with its foreign affiliates.277 
For reasons that are not clear, the law firm members of the Andersen Legal 
network were usually not included in the negotiations between the Final 
Four and Andersen’s foreign accounting offices. They had to negotiate on 
their own.278 Approximately, twenty-one of the thirty-eight law firms went 
to EY Law Services, fourteen to Deloitte & Touche, and two to KPMG.279 
Two of the most prominent members of Andersen Legal decided to revert 
to their former status as stand-alone law firms with no legal network 
affiliation.280 
MDP opponents should take little solace in Andersen Legal’s 
disintegration. It is futile for them to believe “Enron could become the 
 274. Using the number of offices as a benchmark shows the enormous disparity between the 
geographic reach of Andersen Legal, on the one hand, and U.S. and U.K. firms, on the other. White & 
Case ranked third on the list with twenty-four offices. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Allen & Overy, 
and Coudert Brothers tied for fourth place with fifteen offices. Nine firms had between 10 and 14 
offices. Most Lawyers, AM. LAW., Nov. 2001, at 123. 
 275. Cassell Bryan-Low, Ernst & Young, Deloitte, KPMG Look to Hire 200 Partners Each; 
Pricewaterhouse Focuses on Clients, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2002, at C1. 
 276. For a country-by-country list of the new affiliations of Andersen’s foreign accounting offices, 
see Matthew Carr, Ernst & Young Forecasts 20% Rise in Revenue of Andersen Mergers, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS, Apr. 30, 2002. 
 277. Steve Seidenberg, Andersen Legal No Longer Exists; Garrigues’ Transition, NAT’L L.J., July 
8, 2002, at A17. 
 278. Sue Reisinger, Andersen Legal Negotiates Break-Up, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 8, 2002, at A11; Fall 
to Earth: Andersen Legal Took Nearly a Decade to Build, Reaching Lofty Heigths. And Then in a 
Flash, It Was Gone. What Was Holding This Thing Together?, AM. LAW., June 2002, at 17. 
 279. Andersen Aftermath: The Complete Picture, EUROPEAN LEG. BUS., July/Aug. 2002, at 4. 
 280. Garrigues’ Transition, supra note 277; Jan Harvey, No Turning Back for Dundas, LEG. WK., 
Sept. 19, 2002, available at 2002 WL 26453767. 
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Ground Zero for accountancy firms’ legal ambitions.”281 Almost all of the 
member law firms joined a network affiliated with one of the Final Four. 
Their decision is a striking display of faith in the future of side-by-side 
relationships between law firms and accounting firms. The addition of 
twenty-one firms to EY Law Services is certain to give it a larger client-
base, expand its competencies, and strengthen its competitive position in 
certain markets, such as the “plum jurisdictions” of France, Germany, and 
Italy.282 While the precise number of lawyers emigrating from Andersen 
Legal to EY Law Services is not known, their addition is viewed by 
knowledgeable commentators as creating “a formidable global law 
group.”283 
The nay-sayers insist that clients after the Enron debacle will place a 
higher value on independent law firms.284 While this claim may have some 
merit, it overlooks several salient points. First, memories are short. In five 
or ten years, Enron will be a distant recollection. The Final Four and their 
affiliated law firm networks can continue to implement the strategic plan 
previously described during this period. As long as they act cautiously and 
conform their conduct to the controlling regulatory restraints, their growth 
will continue. Over the course of time, legislators may well become 
responsive to lobbying efforts to remove restraints that the Final Four find 
objectionable. Furthermore, the SEC’s current regulation on auditor 
independence285 does not bar a law firm that is a member of Final Four 
network from providing legal services to an audit client of the accounting 
firm with which it is affiliated.286 While the SEC may conceivably take 
action to bar their provision under the recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, the agency has not signaled that it regards amending the regulation as 
a high priority item. 
Second, while the Final Four have agreed to spin off their consulting 
 281. Edward Fennell, I Told You So, Say Critics, THE TIMES (London), Jan. 29, 2002, at Law 3, 
available at 2002 WL 4177341; Geanne Rosenberg, The Enron Implosion: Scandal Seen as Blow to 
Outlook for MDP: Andersen Role a Vindication, Foe Says, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 21, 2002, at A21. 
 282. Andersen Aftermath, supra note 279. 
 283. Reisinger, supra note 278. Why the new additions would make EY Law Services “a 
formidable global law group” is not hard to understand. Before its disintegration, Andersen Legal had 
2,880 lawyers in 36 countries; EY Law Services boasts of 1,850 lawyers in 60 countries. In contrast, 
Baker & McKenzie International, the world’s largest law firm, has only 2,923 lawyers in 31 countries. 
Id. 
 284. See, e.g., Corrine Franks, No Converts to the MDP, COMM. LAW., Mar. 34, 2002, at 34 
(reporting a survey of 75 heads of legal and finance directors at the FTSE 350 companies). 
 285. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2002). 
 286. See Nathan Koppel, A Regulator Budges (and Fudges) on MDPs, AM., Jan. 2001, at 20; 
Geanne Rosenberg, SEC’s New Rules Will Likely Allow Big Five to Expand Legal Services, NAT’L 
L.J., DEC. 4, 2000, at B7. 
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arms, it is not at all clear that they will jettison their tax and related 
consulting services. In some respects, the units offering tax and related 
consulting services are mini-versions of the Fully Integrated Model. It is 
estimated that these units generate fifty percent of the Final Four’s 
revenue. Among the services the units offer are compensation consulting, 
litigation support, and financial advising for wealthy clients.287 While 
these units may not directly compete in the marketplace for legal services, 
the importance of their role in fostering an acceptance of MDPs should not 
be overlooked.  
Third, the marketplace for multidisciplinary business advice that 
includes a legal analysis will continue to grow as global enterprises 
become larger, more companies sell goods and services outside their 
national borders, capital continues to move at lightening speed from one 
end of the globe to the other, and local, national, and international 
authorities expand their regulatory reach. Even if securities regulators are 
successful in preventing the law firm members of a legal network 
affiliated with a Final Four firm from providing legal services to the Final 
Four firm’s audit clients, the number of potential clients is still enormous. 
They range from the non-audit clients of each Final Four firm to the audit 
clients of the individual non-affiliated Final Four firms. 
CONCLUSION 
MONOPOLIST, ARISTOCRAT OR ENTREPRENEUR?:  
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE FUTURE OF MDPS 
Two observations stand out in any comparative analysis of MDPs. The 
first is the remarkable similarity of the concerns expressed by the legal 
professions in the United States, France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom in opposition to MDPs. Despite the professions’ disparate 
histories, structures, regulatory schemes, and legal cultures, lawyers and 
bar associations on both sides of the Atlantic have labeled the same values 
as core. Both reverently invoke “the interest of the public” in rejecting 
proposed changes that would allow partnership and fee sharing between 
lawyers and nonlawyers, especially in the Fully Integrated Model. They 
rest their opposition on the need to preserve a lawyer’s independence, 
avoid conflicts of interest, and protect confidential client information. 
They regularly cite the potential for the corruption of the core values, if 
lawyers and auditors in a single organization are allowed to provide their 
 
 287. Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting Firms Are Still Consulting, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2002, at 
C1. 
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respective services to the same client. Both question whether there is a 
client-driven market demand for “one-stop shopping” and “a seamless 
web” of mixed services. The second is the flip side of the first: the 
similarity in the arguments in favor of MDPs. MDP proponents cite the 
steady and increasing growth of the Big Five’s legal networks as proof of 
market demand. They contend that just as in-house legal departments have 
developed effective procedures for protecting confidential client 
information, MDPs will also develop their own. In the proponents’ view, 
the solution to conflicts of interest problems lies in adequate disclosure to 
the client and informed consent. In short, there is very little difference in 
the rhetoric invoked to support the pro’s and con’s of MDPs, even though 
the supporters may be separated by thousands of miles and disparate legal 
structures and cultures and rules of ethics.  
Deeply embedded ideology more than surface rhetoric makes the MDP 
debate worth investigating from a comparative perspective. In the United 
States, lawyers have long displayed a remarkable entrepreneurial spirit. It 
manifests itself in activities as diverse as the “lottery-style character of 
American litigation,”288 ancillary businesses,289 and lawyers’ eagerness to 
join in-house business teams.290 Characterized as “nimble” by the eminent 
legal historian, Professor Lawrence Friedman,291 the U.S. legal 
profession’s most distinctive attribute may be  
the zeal with which [its lawyers] have developed new organizational 
forms for capturing particular segments of the market for legal 
services or for capitalizing on the economic opportunities presented 
by particular legal problems.292 
It is a serious mistake to assume that the rejection of the MDP 
Recommendations by the ABA House of Delegates in 1999 and 2000 or 
the rejections by the majority of state bars can derail the entrepreneurial 
engine that drives the U.S. legal profession. The growth of ancillary 
businesses is proof positive that lawyers who want to join forces with 
 288. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 108-
10 (1996). 
 289. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text. 
 290. See Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global 
Organization, supra note 62, at 1071-73. 
 291. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 633-48, 687-95 (2d 
ed. 1985). 
 292. Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, New Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of the 
Legal Profession, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992). 
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nonlawyers will find ways to do so.293 The willingness of leading lawyers 
to leave lucrative partnerships and high level government positions to join 
the Big Five is further evidence.294 E&Y’s affiliation with McKee Nelson 
is a harbinger of other contractual relationships between U.S. law firms 
and Big Five firms and U.S. law firms and smaller professional services 
firms.295 Other developments that have received scant attention in the 
MDP debate also point to how successful U.S. lawyers have been in 
capitalizing on economic opportunities. The rush of firms to invest in 
clients in the late 1990’s and the willingness of bar association ethics 
committees to provide them with a roadmap are two obvious examples.296 
A more subtle example is the growth in the number of lawyers who have 
left law firms to join in-house legal departments prompted by the desire to 
become involved with business decision-making and planning.297 
The ideology of entrepreneurialism is almost entirely missing from the 
legal culture in France and Germany and is incipient in the U.K.’s. The 
dominant ideology in France and Germany is best summed up as “the cult 
of independence.” The meaning of independence in France and Germany 
is very different from its meaning in the United States. In the United 
States, a lawyer must be independent of outside influences, especially 
those of other clients or the government. The U.S. lawyer’s loyalty runs 
directly and almost exclusively to the lawyer’s client. For better or worse, 
the U.S. lawyer is the client’s hired gun.298 In France and Germany, the 
lawyer is an aristocrat, independent of the client he or she is representing 
as well as other clients, the government, and even the lawyer’s own 
partners.299 The ideology of aristocratic independence makes the foreign 
lawyer much more of a moral actor than the lawyer’s U.S. counterpart. 
Given the absence of the ideology of entrepreneurialism and the presence 
 293. See supra note 30. 
 294. While these lawyers may have to call themselves “consultants” to avoid UPL restrictions, 
their professional activities at the Big Five are largely indistinguishable from those they performed 
during their law firm or government tenure. See Choosing Wise Men Wisely, supra note 2, at 262-63. 
 295. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text. 
 296. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-418 (2000); Assoc. 
of the Bar of the City of New York, Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2000-3 
(2000). 
 297. See Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global 
Organization, supra note 62, at 1071-73. 
 298. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 14-85 (1994). But 
see, e.g., William Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, 1978 WISC. L. REV. 29; Richard Wasserman, 
Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1975). 
 299. E.g., Synopsis of Henri Ader’s notes, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ader.html (visited Nov. 3, 
2002). M. Ader is the former chair of the Paris Bar Association. Testimony of Ramon Mullerat, at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ader.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2002). 
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of the ideology of aristocratic independence, the resistance of the legal 
professions in France and Germany to permitting MDP relationships 
between lawyers and the Big Five assumes a new dimension. The 
resistance grows out of a deeply embedded self-image more than the 
“professional project” envisioned by Professor Abel.300 While it would be 
foolish to pretend that turf protection is not a monopolistic motive behind 
some of the opposition to MDPs in France and Germany, it would be 
equally foolish to ignore the centrality of the ideology of aristocratic 
independence to the opposition.  
The role of the government in the MDP debate is also a distinguishing 
factor. In the United States, the federal and state governments have stayed 
on the sidelines except for the SEC. The SEC, however, was only 
concerned with assuring the independence of the audit function, if MDPs 
were permitted to offer legal and audit services to the same client.301 In 
contrast, the French and U.K. governments have played a very active role 
in the MDP debate, placing significant pressure on those jurisdictions’ bar 
associations to amend the rules of professional conduct to permit MDP-
type relationships among lawyers and nonlawyers. They view lawyers as 
monopolists and the rules against fee sharing and partnerships with 
nonlawyers as anticompetitive, injuring consumers.  
The governments have deliberately crafted their proposed reforms, 
moreover, with an eye to making the legal professions in France and the 
United Kingdom more competitive with foreign law firms and non-law 
firm rivals. The Nallet Report in France acknowledged the disadvantages 
that French firms were experiencing in competing with large U.S. law 
firms and U.K. solicitor firms.302 The Office of Fair Trading in the United 
Kingdom wanted to expand the range of permissible ties between 
solicitors and nonsolicitors to foster competition in the delivery of legal 
and law-related services. It reasoned that the expansion would benefit 
consumers and strengthen the ability of solicitor firms, especially small-
size ones, to compete with nonsolicitor firms, such as banks and insurance 
companies.303  
Finally, the question must be asked, what contribution to the MDP 
debate, if any, can a comparative perspective offer? The first and most 
 300. Lawyers in the Civil Law World, supra note 33, at 8-9; Lawyers as Monopolists, 
Aristrocrats, and Entrepreneurs, supra note 233. 
 301. See supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text. 
 302. See THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra 
note 54, at 211-15. 
 303. See COMPETITION IN THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 186, at 1-12. 
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obvious answer is that a comparative perspective demonstrates the futility 
of the bar associations’ opposition. The ABA, the CCBE, and their 
counterparts in France, Germany, and the U.K. were not able to stop the 
Big Five from offering legal services either under the guise of 
“consulting” or through the establishment of contractual relationships. The 
second answer is that the forces for change are located in very different 
places. The ideology of entrepreneurialism is driving MDP supporters in 
the United States. In France and the United Kingdom, the government is 
leading the charge, actively intervening to strengthen the legal profession’s 
competitive position in the marketplace for cross-border legal services 
and/or to promote competition to benefit individual, domestic consumers. 
The third answer is that the Contractual or Side-by-Side Model is likely to 
be the preferred MDP structure for the immediate future outside the 
United States. It is more appealing to lawyers in France and Germany than 
the Fully Integrated Model because it is more consistent with the ideology 
of aristocratic independence. The fourth answer is that the number and size 
of MDPs in the United States will expand propelled by ideology of 
entrepreneurialism. Some law firms will partially achieve the benefits of 
the integrated model through the establishment of ancillary businesses, a 
relationship between lawyers and nonlawyers that the rules of conduct 
already permit. Other law firms will opt for the Contractual or Side-by-
Side Model with nonlawyers learned in different disciplines. This 
relationship too can pass muster under the existing rules of professional 
conduct, if it is properly structured. Lastly, the Final Four are likely to 
prefer the contractual relationship over other MDP structures both in the 
United States and abroad because it should enable them to avoid the 
paralyzing conflicts of interest that would arise in an integrated MDP with 
offices around the globe. 
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